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As global water withdrawals increase, policy analysis increasingly requires 
refined understanding of the causes, correlates, and implications of such trends.  
The following dissertation presents three separate studies addressing water 
management issues.  The studies are a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, intended to shed light on current issues in water resource economics and 
policy.  While the focus of these studies is water, the methods and results are 
relevant to environmental and natural resource policy in general. 
 
The first study investigates how patterns of water withdrawals and water use 
correlate with economic growth at the national and state levels.  The goal of this 
study is to contribute both to the literature on the relationship between economic 
growth and the environment, as well as to the literature on water use forecasting.   
 
The second study analyzes the correlation between national income and water 
footprints.  A nation’s water footprint represents the sum of water consumed 
directly plus the net import of “virtual water”, a term coined to denote the amount 
of water necessary to produce agricultural and industrial goods.  Thus, while the 
previous study addressed water withdrawals, this study looks at international trade 
in goods produced with the water.  As such, the two studies can be seen as 
addressing the production and consumption sides of water.  This study also 
complements the first in that it addresses the issue left unanswered by the first 
study of whether countries may alter their own water withdrawals by 
compensating with consumption of water intensive goods from other countries.   
 
The third study presents evidence that warnings and threats of large scale violence 
over increasingly scarce water resources appear to be more common than past 
iv 
 
experience would suggest likely, and presents an analysis of reasons why such 
warnings are so common.  It discusses incentives faced various stakeholders for 
stressing and even intentionally exaggerating the risks of violent conflict.  The 
goal of this study is to contribute to the fields of environmental security, water 
management, and peace and conflict studies. 
 
The hope is that each of these studies will serve to inform policy-makers and 
planners regarding the likelihood of water use patterns and their expected impacts, 
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All three of the studies contained herein address issues of water policy and 
management. The first two are largely quantitative analyses of the relationship 
between economic growth and water use.  A better understanding of this 
relationship will allow planners and policy-makers to better predict future water 
use patterns, and offers insight to larger questions regarding economic growth and 
natural resource management and environmental quality in general.  The third 
study presents an overview of the literature on conflict over water resources and 
presents evidence that several actors face incentives to stress and even exaggerate 
such risks.  Identifying such incentives will allow analysts to better evaluate the 
veracity and seriousness of conflict potential.  Because the three studies are 
largely self-contained, separate abstracts are offered for each below. 
 
 
Chapter 1.  Water use and economic growth: Is there an EKC for water use? 
 
Predictions of national and global water use have been criticized for being 
inaccurate and for not taking into consideration economic development. Of the 
little research that does address water use as a function of economic development, 
some claims no relationship, while other studies find a clear environmental 
Kuznets curves (EKC) or “inverted U” relationship. This research attempts to 
elucidate the relationship between income growth and freshwater use by a) 
evaluating a variety of cross-sectional and panel datasets on water withdrawals 
and consumptive use and b) employing both traditional least squares and non-
parametric regression analysis, the latter of which offers the advantage of not 
assuming a given functional form.  The research finds some support for the 
existence of an EKC, but results are highly dependent on choice of datasets and 
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statistical technique.  Results are also sector specific and prove poor indicators of 
individual country behavior.   
 
Chapter 2.  Virtual water trade and income: Is there an EKC for water 
footprints? 
 
The concept of virtual water – the amount of water needed to produce crops and 
industrial goods – has become an increasingly popular metaphor in water 
management and policy discourse. A nation’s water footprint is a nation’s water 
withdrawals plus its net import of virtual water.  This paper investigates the 
correlation between national per capita water footprints and per capita income and 
compares this to research on per capita water withdrawals and income, for which 
previous studies have found an inverted U relationship, also called an 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC).  Least squares and nonparametric regression 
techniques are utilized.  Water footprints do not display the inverted U 
relationship found for per capita withdrawals, but rather, a monotonically 
increasing relationship.  Results suggest that at least some of the decline in per 
capita withdrawals by economically developed countries may be due to increased 
import of virtual water from poorer countries. 
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Chapter 3. Hydro-political hyperbole: Examining incentives for exaggerating 
the risks of water wars 
 
Predictions of inevitable and imminent wars over scarce water are routinely made 
by prominent political figures, academics, journalists, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  These statements continue to occur despite both a 
questionable theoretical foundation and relatively little empirical evidence to 
support them.  This study demonstrates that several sets of actors each have 
differing incentives to stress and even exaggerate the probability of war over 
water.  Policy makers, for instance, may use threats of war to highlight the 
importance of water issues otherwise seen as “low politics.”  Their target 
audience may be neighboring countries, the international community, or domestic 
constituencies.  Journalists have incentives to highlight issues relating to violent 
conflicts, which are deemed inherently newsworthy.  Academics and 
environmental and development NGOs have incentives to focus on the possibility 
of war because it can raise the profile of their work, increase access to decision-
makers and journalists, and expand the types of funding available.  Some 
elements of the private sector have an incentive to stress how water-related 
infrastructure may stave off war.  All parties have incentives to use the specter of 
war as a way of highlighting related issues that might not otherwise receive public 
attention.  This confluence of such an array of incentives has likely contributed to 




Water use and economic growth: 
Is there an EKC for water use? 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
By some estimates, humanity has already appropriated over half of the world’s available 
water resources (Postel, et al, 1996; Loh and Wackernagel, 2004).  As growth rates for 
global water withdrawals continue to outpace even global population growth, several 
governments, international development agencies and leading researchers have pointed to 
global water scarcity as a potentially serious economic, health, and even security issue 
(e.g., Postel, et al, 1996; Gleick, 2000; World Water Commission, 2000).  Projections of 
future water scarcity are numerous; however, measurements of actual water use and 
predictions of future water availability and consumption rates have proven difficult to 
estimate accurately (Shiklomanov, 2000; Gleick, 2000, 2003).   
 
One of the difficulties in correctly calibrating such predictions lies in specifying the role 
that factors other than population play in determining water use.  Among these factors are 
economic growth and associated changes in technology, management institutions, diet, 
and education, which are all believed to impact consumption patterns, but are rarely taken 
into account in global water use projections (Gleick, 2000).   
 
Estimates of income elasticity of demand for water for domestic use are commonplace as 
part of standard demand curve estimations.  Little published literature, however, has 
examined the relationship between income and overall water use at the state or national 
level.  The few studies that have investigated such a relationship have produced 
conflicting results.  For instance, Gleick (2003) found no clear relationship between 
national water withdrawals per capita and per capita income, while some others claim 
that the relationship follows an inverted-U or Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) type 
path, in which per capita water withdrawals initially rise and then decline with respect to 
income (e.g., Rock, 1998; Rock, 2001; Goklany, 2002).  Study results vary depending on 




This paper attempts to clarify this water-income relationship.  The study goes beyond 
previous water-income research by analyzing multiple cross-sectional and panel datasets, 
using both traditional least squares and non-parametric regression techniques.  In so 
doing, it also highlights some unique issues that arise when using natural resource use, 
rather than pollution levels, as environmental indicators in EKC studies.   
 
The structure of this paper proceeds as follows:  Section 2 presents a critical review of 
some of the methodologies and objectives of previous EKC and water-income studies.  It 
also offers a brief discussion of some important distinctions between pollution based and 
resource based EKC studies.  Section 3 presents this study’s design and rationale.  
Section 4 presents the results of the analysis of the relationship between national per 
capita water use and per capita income using international cross-sectional data and panel 
data for OECD nations and U.S. states.  Section 5 extends the analysis of the panel data 
to cover total water withdrawals, and, in the case of the U.S., per capita and total 
consumptive use.  Section 6 offers a summary and conclusion.   
 
2.  Water Use and Income – Previous Empirical Studies  
2.1   A Review of Water and Income Studies 
Building primarily on the environmental Kuznets curve literature a small number of 
researchers have examined how water use correlates with national income.  Rock (1998) 
analyzed cross-sectional data on national water withdrawals, as well as panel data on U.S. 
state consumptive use. He found that per capita water withdrawals and consumptive use 
both followed an inverted U path, consistent with an EKC hypothesis.1  Gleick (2003) 
found no relationship when examining a dataset of per capita national water withdrawals 
and income.  Goklany (2002) presented a qualitative assessment of water use showing 
that per capita agricultural water withdrawals in the United States seem to display an 
                                                 
1 In a follow-up study, Rock (2001) also suggested that “wateruse intensity declines across the entire range 
of per capita incomes extant in the world today… [and] the relationship between intensity of use and 
income is mediated by an economy’s natural water endowment, the structure of the economy, and 
government policies”  (p.57). 
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inverted U form.  Jia et al (2006) found an EKC for industrial water use for most OECD 
countries, and Bhattarai (2004) found an EKC for irrigated land for tropical countries. 
 
Several empirical and conceptual issues bring into question the robustness of the results 
of these water-income studies.  Rock’s study was the first such water-income study.  The 
international cross-sectional data on water withdrawals that Rock utilized, for instance, 
were from a wide range of different years for different countries, with little consistency 
among countries regarding estimation techniques.2  Perhaps more importantly, in his 
regression model, Rock included explanatory variables other than income, such as 
dummy variables for geographic regions, measures of the efficiency of water in 
agriculture, trade openness, and others, while leaving out other variables known to impact 
withdrawals, such as price.   
 
Like much of the EKC literature, Rock is not explicit about whether he is attempting to 
identify a general correlation between income growth and his environmental indicator 
(water use) or whether he is attempting to isolate the specific impact of income growth.  
By including several other explanatory variables, including those that covary with 
income, it seems that Rock was attempting to isolate the role of income.  However, by 
not including relevant variables such as price, his model is subject to omitted variable 
bias.  Thus, his analysis provides neither a simple net correlation between income and 
water use, nor the isolated impact of income on water use.     
 
The question of whether the research is investigating correlation or attempting to discern 
a causal relationship is essential to the choice of an appropriate econometric model.  
Much of the early EKC research used a reduced form model in which an environmental 
indicator (usually some measure of pollution) was simply regressed on income and its 
square (and sometimes cube).  The simple model is sufficient to highlight a correlation, 
                                                 
2 Rock used data from the World Resources Institute (WRI, 1996), which in turn, took the data largely from 
Aquastat, a data-gathering program of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization.  The range 
of years in which individual country water withdrawals were estimated spanned from 1965 to 1995.  
Regarding this data, Gleick (2000) stated “Extreme care should be used when applying these data – they 
are often the least reliable and most inconsistent of all water-resources information.  They come from a 
wide variety of sources and are collected using a wide variety of approaches, with few formal standards…  
The data also represent many different time periods, making direct intercomparisons difficult.”   
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reflecting both direct and indirect effects of income (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).  It 
does not identify more proximate relationships that may be more causal in nature 
(Moomaw and Unrah, 1997).  Early on researchers recognized that other explanatory 
variables, such as institutional structure, level of education, political lobbies, and even the 
outsourcing of pollution production, may actually play an important role in driving 
decreases in pollution among rich countries.  Such variables were intentionally omitted 
from the early regression equations, however, because they were seen as endogenous to 
economic growth (Seldon and Song, 1994).  
 
The reliance on a simple reduced form model led to common critiques of omitted variable 
bias in EKC studies.  Numerous subsequent studies included additional non-income 
explanatory variables such as literacy, income distribution, and trade openness, and found 
that these additional variables correlated positively with environmental quality and 
collectively reduce or even eliminate the significance of the income variable (e.g., Torras 
and Boyce, 1998).  Such studies are attempting to isolate the direct causal impact of 
income on the environment.  However, to the extent that non-income variables are 
themselves a function of income, such results do not necessarily detract from the EKC 
hypothesis, which, at its most basic level, simply implies a robust U-shaped correlation 
between some measure of environmental quality and income.   
 
The decision regarding the choice of model – reduced form or comprehensive – should 
depend on what question the researcher is attempting to answer.  The distinction is 
significant in terms of policy prescriptions stemming from the research.  Identifying an 
overall correlation may be useful for predicting trends, for instance; while isolating the 
direct contribution of income vis-à-vis other relevant variables may be more important 
for planning policy interventions.3  In either case, it is critical that the researcher be clear 
                                                 
3 Comprehensive models which include multiple variables are common in studies estimating income 
elasticities of demand for water.  These models attempt to isolate the effect of income by including all 
relevant explanatory variables including price.  Many such studies have been undertaken for urban and 
residential water use, with the majority finding positive income elasticities of demand (e.g., Hanemann, 
1998; Dalhuisen et al, 2001, 2003).  However, elasticity studies have generally not been expanded to cover 
other large water consuming sectors, namely agriculture and industry, as these sectors use water as an input 
rather than as a final good; thus, they are generally modeled using profit maximization models, which 
presume that water is consumed at its rate of marginal productivity (Young, 2005).   
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about what question s/he is intending to answer  Often researchers in the EKC literature 
have not been careful to make such a distinction. 
 
In contrast to early EKC studies that used reduced form equations to identify an empirical 
relationship, which they then sought to explain, Rock began with an attempt at a 
comprehensive model.  However, studies attempting to isolate the impact of income need 
to develop a model that includes all relevant variables, lest they themselves suffer from 
omitted variable bias.   
 
While Rock’s study was the first and most comprehensive of the water income studies, 
each of the other studies listed above also has significant limitations.  Neither Gleick’s 
nor Goklany’s studies were quantitatively rigorous and essentially amounted to a simple 
eyeballing of graphical scatterplots.  Both Bhattarai’s (2004) and Jia et al’s (2006) studies 
were limited to a single sector for a limited number of countries.  Bhattarai (2004) tested 
both a reduced form and a comprehensive model and concluded that the EKC 
relationship was a robust finding (though he did not report whether he performed any 
specification tests of alternative functional forms).  The dependent variable in his study, 
however, was not water for irrigation, but changes in the percentage of crop area 
irrigated, and so, served only as a proxy for agricultural water use.   
 
Jia et al (2006) used a reduced form model to analyze time series data of several OECD 
nations’ industrial sector water withdrawals and found most to follow an EKC.  The 
authors did not find such a relationship when analyzing the same data as a panel with 
fixed or random effects models. They attributed this difference in results to wide 
variation across nations in terms of the income level at which a turning point was found.  
The authors therefore concluded that despite finding statistically significant EKCs, 
income was not a good predictor of a nation’s industrial water use. 
 
In sum, only a few studies have attempted to look at water use as a function of income at 
a national or state level.  Most of those claim to have found some sort of inverted U type 
relationship.  Because of questions of appropriateness of model choice, quality of data, or 
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a focus restricted to a single sector or region, however, questions as to the robustness of 
such findings still remain. 
 
2.2  Natural Resource EKCs 
The majority of EKC literature examines pollution levels as a function of income. This 
has led to the criticism that such research ignores the natural resource component of 
environmental quality (Arrow et al, 1995).  Of the studies that have examined resource 
use, the majority focused on deforestation (e.g., Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; 
Panayotou, 1993; Cropper and Griffiths, 1994; Koop and Tole, 1999; Ehrhardt Martinez 
et al, 2002; Culas, 2007), while only a few addressed other forms of resource use, 
including energy (e.g., Suri and Chapman, 1998) and water.4   
 
These studies tend to treat resource use identically to pollution as an indicator of 
environmental quality.  Like pollution, resource use can provide an economic benefit 
coupled with an undesired environmental impact. Thus, many of the theoretical 
explanations for the existence of EKCs for natural resources mirror those for pollution. 
These include, for instance, increasing income elasticity of demand for environmental 
quality, economies of scale in resource conserving equipment, outsourcing of 
environmental impacts (e.g. pollution havens), and structural development type 
rationales, under which nations’ economies change sequentially from being primarily 
based on rain-fed agriculture, developing to intensive irrigated agriculture, then to 
manufacturing, and finally, to a less resource intensive service-sector orientation.5   
 
Several characteristics distinguish natural resources from pollution in terms of their 
relationship to income, however.  This is especially true for resources such as water that 
tend not to be traded in large quantities internationally.  These include (1) limited 
                                                 
4 A limited number of EKC studies addressed other forms of environmental indicators; for example Managi 
(2006) modeled exposure to pesticides.  For reviews of EKC literature see Panayotou (2000) and Stern 
(2001, 2004). 
5 In the case of water, irrigated agriculture is by far the largest water consuming sector.  Therefore, to the 
extent that manufacturing and services displace intensive agriculture (and not simply supplement it), the 
point at which the decline in water consumption takes place would be expected to come, according to such 
a structural development theory, at an even lower level of per capita income than in the case of pollution, 
which the theory predicts would reach its peak with development of the manufacturing sector.   
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supplies, and therefore, maximum levels of usage, (2) the role of natural endowments in 
influencing access to many resources, (3) the fact that natural resources are goods which 
generally command a positive market price, as opposed to pollution, which is simply an 
undesired byproduct of production or consumption of other goods, (4) the fact that, as 
goods, and not bads, a reduction is not necessarily desirable, and (5) a direct economic 
cost involved in resource extraction and acquisition.   
 
According to Hotelling’s Rule, the marginal net benefit of natural resource use (price 
minus marginal extraction costs), should, ceteris paribus, rise at a rate equal to the 
discount rate if the resource is being extracted at an efficient rate.  If demand is a positive 
function of income, the Hotelling model itself could explain the existence of an inverse U 
shaped relationship for a given resource, provided increasing income and prices over 
time.  In such a case, even if the actual impact of income is to raise demand, the increased 
scarcity and consequent rise in price could eventually overwhelm the income effect.  
Thus, despite the similarities between resource and pollution based environmental 
indicators in EKC studies, they should not be treated identically.  In practice, however, 
these distinctions are rarely if ever taken into account. 
 
3.  Study Rationale and Methods 
This study goes beyond previous water-income analyses in several ways.  First, it uses 
cross-sectional and panel data covering international and U.S. state data.  The datasets 
include cross-sectional data on per capita water withdrawals for 149 countries, panel data 
on total and per capita water withdrawals by 30 OECD nations, and panel data on total 
and per capita water withdrawals and consumptive use by the 48 continental U.S. states.  
Withdrawals and consumptive use are measured both in aggregate and by sector.  
Sectoral analyses are helpful, for instance, in evaluating structural development type 
theories of water-income patterns. 
 
Critics note that cross-sectional data provide only a snap-shot in time, and indicate little 
regarding dynamic processes assumed to underlie an EKC (de Bruyn et al, 1998; Unruh 
and Moomaw, 1998; Dasgupta et al, 2002).  Reliable and consistent international data 
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covering developing countries are only available in cross-sectional form, however.  
While panel data is preferable, such data are available only for OECD countries and U.S. 
states.  Though panel data are arguably more telling than cross-sectional data for EKC 
studies, several researchers have pointed out that questions regarding stationarity, 
integration, homogeneity, and cross-sectional dependence of data can limit the reliability 
of conclusions based on panel data as well (e.g. List and Gallet, 1999, Stern, 2004; 
Bradford et al, 2005; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2005; Muller-Furstenberger and Wagner, 
2007).  Furthermore, if fixed effects models are being utilized, results can be biased and 
inconsistent if country specific characteristics are correlated with income (Chimeli and 
Braden, 2006).  This study therefore uses multiple datasets in order to assess the 
robustness of results.  
 
Second, this study restricts itself to testing only a reduced form model.  Such an approach 
limits the analysis to simply testing for correlations between water use and income, rather 
than isolating a direct income impact on water use.  It is, however, in the spirit of the 
original EKC studies which were testing for general correlations between environmental 
indicators and income.  Indeed, in the case of normal goods such as natural resources, it 
can be argued that the reduced form model is what distinguishes an EKC study from a 
traditional demand curve estimation model.   
 
Any attempt to provide a comprehensive model would need to include price variables, 
else it suffer from omitted variable bias.  Price data on water are not only difficult to 
obtain for many countries, but unlike other natural resources such as oil, water does not 
have a single global or national reference price.  It often varies by sector, consumer, and 
geographic locale.  Water is also often priced according to volumetric tariffs, making 
price a particularly unwieldy variable for large scale studies. Given these practical and 
theoretical reasons for not including price variables, a reduced form EKC model was 
chosen for the current analysis.   
 
Third, this study tests various functional forms, with the independent variable included in 
level, quadratic, and cubic forms.  As opposed to the case of pollution, there is no reason 
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to suspect (or desire) a permanent decline in water use, as would be implied with a 
quadratic model.  A cubic model allows for an initial reduction, without forcing this 
downturn to continue indefinitely.  Several EKC studies have shown cubic models to be 
statistically significant (e.g., Grossman and Kruger, 1991; List and Gallet, 1999).   
 
Several EKC studies have used statistical techniques other than least squares, including 
spline regressions (segmenting either by time or income) (e.g. Moomah and Unruh, 1997; 
Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson, 1998; Panayotou et al, 1999) and, more recently, 
nonparametric or semi-parametric techniques (e.g. Taskin and Zaim, 2000; Zaim and 
Taskin, 2000; Millimet et al, 2003; Vollebergh et al, 2005; Deacon and Norman, 2006).  
Millimet et al found significant differences between the parametric and nonparametric 
results, indicating that assumptions about functional form may be biasing results.   
 
In addition to least squares, this study uses the Lowess nonparametric regression 
technique6 as an alternative method of analysis for the cross-sectional data.  Lowess 
forms a best fit curve by conducting localized regressions over small, overlapping subsets 
of the data, often called bin size or bandwidth. The primary advantage of such a 
nonparametric regression method is that it estimates a best fit curve to data without 
necessitating any prior assumptions regarding functional form (DiNardo and Tobias, 
2001).  Such regressions do not produce functions easily represented by mathematical 
formulae, but can better represent the actual relationship between variables.  To this 
author’s knowledge, Lowess has not been used in prior EKC analyses, although Taskin 
and Zaim (2000) use Kernel regression, a similar nonparametric technique, to evaluate 
national carbon dioxide production efficiency. 
 
In the case of panel data, because fixed effects allows one to control for factors such as 
natural endowments, climate, and other country specific variables, it is possible to 
measure and compare both per capita and overall water use vis-à-vis income.  While per 
capita use is thought to be a more direct function of standard of living, total water use is a 
                                                 
6 Lowess  is sometimes referred to by other names, including LOESS and locally weighted polynomial 
regression (NIST, 2006). 
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more significant indicator in terms of environmental impact.  It is therefore important to 
understand how each changes as a function of income.  Depending on population and 
income growth rates, a country’s per capita withdrawals may decrease with respect to 
income, while its total withdrawals do not.  This study, therefore, analyzes total water 
withdrawals and consumptive use in addition to per capita measures with the panel data. 
 
FAO and OECD datasets cover only water withdrawals. However, consumptive use of 
water – that amount not returned to the watershed in usable form – is often the relevant 
policy variable in water planning.  This study uses U.S. state data on both withdrawals 
and consumptive use to identify the degree to which the former is a good proxy for the 
latter with respect to income growth. 
 
4.  Water Use and Income: A Reassessment 
This section presents results of the empirical analysis for per capita water withdrawals for 
each of the three datasets, followed by results for total water withdrawals for the OECD 
and U.S. state panel data.  It then compares withdrawals and consumptive use for the U.S. 
data. 
 
4.1  Cross-sectional Data - National Water Withdrawals 
Using a dataset formed of water and population variables from FAO’s Aquastat database 
and GDP from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, I first analyzed a 
cross-sectional dataset of per capita national annual water withdrawals (AWW/N) and 
income (GDP/N).7  Summary statistics for the dataset are presented in Table 1.1.  
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regressions were run using the logs of AWW/N and 
GDP/N as the units of analysis for the dependent and independent variables, represented 
in Equation 1 below by WATER and INC respectively.  Use of log-log regressions is 
consistent with much of the EKC literature (Stern, 2004).  Various alternative functional 
                                                 
7 Annual water withdrawal data were based on best estimates from the period 1998-2002.  GDP data was 
measured in 2000 U.S. dollars.  GDP per capita was calculated using World Bank national GDP figures and 




forms were tested, with the independent variable included in linear, quadratic, and cubic 
forms, following Equation 1 below.  
 
(Eq. 1)  WATERi = β0 + β1INCi + β2INCi2 + β3INCi3 + ei 
 
where e represents an error term, the subscript i represents the unit of observation - an 
individual country, and βs represent parameters to be estimated. 
 
Results from the regressions showed that both linear and quadratic forms are significant 
at a 1% level, while all variables in a cubic function are significant at the 10% level 
(Table 1.2).  Results for the quadratic equation are consistent with, and seem to be highly 
supportive of, the existence of an EKC.  A positive income elasticity is found up until a 
turning point of $9,620 per capita GDP, beyond which the relationship turns negative. 
This per capita income level is less than half the income level at which Rock (1998) 
found a turning point for his EKC of international water withdrawals. The cubic 
functional form describes a monotonic increase at a declining rate for the range of data. 
 
The results of a Lowess regression of log (AWW/N) on log (GDP/N) are shown in Figure 
1.1a, together with a graph of the predicted values using the results of the GLS quadratic 
form regression.8  The Lowess shows withdrawals monotonically increasing with respect 
to income, but at a decreasing rate.  There is little evidence of the downturn predicted by 
the EKC hypothesis.  Although the Lowess and the GLS graphs are quite similar, the 
inverted U found with least squares regression appears simply to be an outcome of the 
choice of a quadratic functional form, rather than a reflection of a genuine trend. 
 
Examining water withdrawals by sector allows for a decomposition of trends and for 
testing of a possible scale effect, according to which countries would tend to develop out 
of agriculture and water intensive industry.  Separate regressions were estimated using 
the log per capita water withdrawals for each of the three dominant water consuming 
                                                 
8 A bandwidth of 0.8 was used for LOWESS regressions in this study.  Additional regressions using 
alternative bandwidths did not produce qualitatively different results. 
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sectors: agriculture, industry, and domestic use.  A strong quadratic relationship is found 
in the case of agriculture, by far the largest consumer of water (Table 1.3). The turning 
point predicted with a quadratic form is at a per capita income of only $1,953.  A Lowess 
regression produces a result almost identical to that of the fitted quadratic form (Figure 
1.1b), providing support that the inverted U relationship is robust for agricultural use. 
 
In the case of water withdrawals for domestic sector use, the quadratic model is highly 
significant, with a predicted turning point at a per capita GDP of over $23,200, at the 
upper range of the data sampled.  A Lowess regression is nearly identical, however, again 
it seems to show a relationship that is monotonically increasing with respect to income 
but at a decreasing rate within the range of the data (Figure 1.1c).  This is consistent with 
results from previous estimates of income elasticity of demand for domestic water use.  
 
In regressions of per capita industrial water withdrawals on income, the linear form is 
significant at the 1% level, while the square of the income variable in the quadratic form 
is significant only at a 9% level for the quadratic model (Table 1.3).  This suggests a 
constant positive income elasticity of withdrawals.  A Lowess regression of industrial 
withdrawals, however, shows a monotonically increasing trend (Figure 1.1d), which is 
actually better estimated by a higher order polynomial, such as a cubic functional form.  
A least squares regression using a cubic functional form was indeed significant at the 1% 
level.  Cubic functional forms for domestic and agricultural use were not statistically 
significant and therefore are not shown in Table 1.3 below. 
 
In sum, results from this cross-sectional dataset suggest that overall national water 
withdrawals per capita level off as a function of income, and the evidence for an EKC for 
water withdrawals is weak.  The analysis of withdrawals by sector suggests that such an 
inverted U curve may be present for agricultural water use, but not for withdrawals for 
domestic and industrial uses, the income elasticity of which remains positive throughout 
the entire range of the data.   
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Table 1.1.  FAO Dataset Summary Statistics  
Variable Mean   Standard. 
Deviation   
Minimum   Maximum 
GDP (billions of 2000 US$) 211   921 0.20 9,765 
GDP per capita (2000 US$) 5,528   8,764 84 37,230 
AWW (km3)  25.05   84.88 0.01 645.84 
AWW per capita (m3) 536   634 6.55 5,142 
Sources: Data on water withdrawals and population is from FAO’s Aquastat database (2006). GDP data is 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (2006). Sample size (n)=149. 
 
 
Table 1.2.  GLS Regression - FAO Log(AWW/N) on Log(GDP/N) 
Dependent Variable Log (AWW/N) (m3/cap/year)
Independent 
Variable 
































Adjusted R-squared 0.146 0.185 0.198 
Turning point  $9,620 n/a 
Note: Sample size (n) = 149.  Coefficient results are presented with robust standard errors in parenthesis 
and p-values below the standard errors.  GDP per capita was measured in constant 2000 US$.  . 
 
 
Table 1.3.  GLS Regression – FAO Log(AWW/N) on Log(GDP/N) by Sector 
Dependent 
Variable 
Log (Agricultural AWW/N)  
n=148 
Log (Domestic AWW/N) 
n=148 




Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic  Linear Quadratic  Cubic 
Constant 4.890  








-5.160   











Log(GDP/N) -0.017   
(0.112) 
0.876 
2.940   
(0.942)      
0.002 
0.475    
(0.046)    
 0.000 
1.930    
(0.346) 
0.000 






16.595    
(4.792)  
0.001 
(Log(GDP/N))2   -0.194    








-2.085    
(0.645) 
0.002 
(Log(GDP/N))3       0.089 
(0.028) 
0.002 
Adj..R-squared 0.000 0.0625 0.430 0.473 0.363 0.373 0.405 






     
 





Figure 1.1c.  AWW/N – Domestic 
 
Figure 1.1d. AWW/N – Industry 
 
 
Figures 1.1a-d.  Fitted GLS and Lowess Curves of Log(AWW/N) on Log(GDP/N)
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4.2  Panel Data - OECD National and U.S. State Withdrawals  
 
4.2.1.  OECD National Per Capita Withdrawals 
Given the limitations of inference from cross-sectional data concerning the effect of 
income on water use, fixed effects regressions were also run using two datasets, one of 
OECD member withdrawals and one of U.S. state withdrawals.  The first dataset was an 
unbalanced panel dataset of water withdrawals of the thirty OECD nations estimated for 
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 20009 (OECD, 2006) and population and GDP data from the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2006, 2007).  Fixed effects were used to account for 
differences among nations in terms of climate,10 initial endowments of water, and other 
country or state specific factors that may determine water use.  Again, reduced form 
models were used, following Equation 2 below: 
 
(Eq. 2)  WATERit = β0 + αi + β1INCit + β2INC2it + β3INC3it + eit 
 
As in the cross-sectional case, the variables WATER and INC represent the logs of per 
capita annual water withdrawals (AWW/N) and per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP/N) respectively.  The country fixed effect is captured by the term α.  The subscripts 
i and t represent the individual country and the year of observation, respectively.11    
 
Summary statistics for the dataset are provided in Table 1.4.  Again log values of per 
capita withdrawals and GDP were used as units of analysis.  Local non-parametric 
density regressions are not amenable to fixed effects panel data, and so no such tests were 
performed with these data. 
 
                                                 
9 The dataset was an unbalanced panel, as values were missing from various countries for some years.  The 
average number of observations per country was 4.0 out of the possible 5. 
10 Although climate varies and technically is not a fixed effect, broad differences reflecting average 
temperature and precipitation will be captured by a fixed effect variable. 
11 Some researchers have also included a time trend variable when using time series and panel data sets for 
EKCs, even in reduced form models.  To some degree, because time and income are closely correlated, the 
decision whether or not to include a time variable begs the question of whether one is trying to isolate the 
impact of income or identify overall trends between income and an environmental impact. This study 
reports results without a time trend.  All regressions were also run with a linear time trend.  Results are not 
included herein, but in most cases, they do not change conclusions in any qualitative sense. 
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The OECD panel data provide stronger evidence of an EKC than do the international 
cross-sectional data.  Coefficients on income and its square are significant at the 1% level 
for the quadratic functional form, the only functional form tested for which coefficients 
were significant at any conventional level (Table 1.5).12  The predicted turning point for 
the EKC is at a per capita income level of $8,775.  This is slightly lower than, but 
consistent with, the figure of $9,620 predicted using the cross-sectional data.  
 
Among the advantages of panel datasets over cross-sectional ones are that they capture 
actual changes in country behavior over time and can account for variation due to 
inherent differences in the countries being observed.  While the results of the regression 
provide strong evidence for an EKC, inspection of individual countries’ withdrawal 
patterns shows little conformity to the predicted EKC model.  Only three countries in the 
dataset, Korea, Portugal, and Spain, had per capita income levels that spanned both sides 
of the predicted turning point of $8,775.  Of these three, Korea’s per capita withdrawals 
increase monotonically with respect to income, Portugal’s display no clear trend, and 
only Spain’s follows an EKC-type trajectory.  Furthermore, EKC patterns are displayed 
both by countries well below and well above the estimated turning point income, but so 
too are monotonically rising and monotonically falling relationships.  One high-income 
country, the UK, even displays a U-shaped relationship.  Lack of clear patterns for 
individual countries is perhaps not surprising, given a limited time series.  The variation 
in the turning point by country, while in conflict with most EKC theoretical models 
which posit a single turning point, is, however, consistent with empirical findings in other 
studies (e.g., Lieb, 2004; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2005).  In sum, regressions on per 
capita withdrawals seem to present strong evidence for an EKC relationship for water 
use, but regression results prove a poor indicator of actual water withdrawal patterns. 
 
While the results from overall per capita withdrawals are generally consistent with those 
found in the cross-sectional regressions, a much different picture emerges when the 
OECD data are analyzed by sector.  The quadratic functional form is highly statistically 
                                                 
12 None of the functional forms tested provided significant results when level values were used as units of 
observation and so results are not reported here. 
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significant for the public sector and for industrial manufacturing use, but not for irrigation 
or water used as coolant for power generation facilities (Table 1.6).13,14  In fact, irrigation 
and coolant uses actually display a U shaped curve, with withdrawals declining with 
income up until income levels of $11,650 and $10,672 respectively, and increasing 
thereafter.  This is in direct contrast to the cross-sectional results and to structural 
development explanations of EKCs.  The results for the public sector also stand in 
contrast to most income elasticity estimates, which have found positive elasticities of 
demand for most industrialized nations (e.g., Dalhuisen et al, 2003).    A possible 
explanation is that initial improvements in efficiency usually made at medium levels of 
economic development are eventually taken over by income effects. 
 
                                                 
13 The public sector includes domestic and commercial uses drawing from public sources, and so is not 
completely comparable to the domestic figure for the cross-sectional data.  Furthermore, the OECD 
provides data on water for irrigation rather than agricultural use as a whole.  
14 It is worth noting that most, but not all OECD countries provided separate data for industrial 
manufacturing and coolant uses.  A log-log regression of the sum of industrial and coolant withdrawals on 
income was not significant at the 10% level for either the linear or quadratic functional forms, although the 
quadratic did have the expected signs. 
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Table 1.4.    OECD Panel Dataset Summary Statistics  
 Number of countries: 30    Time period covered: 1980-2000 at five year intervals 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP per capita (2000 US$)  17,332.57 9,975.29 1,897   46,278 
AWW (km3)   37,406.92 95,317.09 57    517,720 
AWW/N (m3/cap/year) 726.15 749.32 136.02 4,524.35 
 
 
Table 1.5.    Fixed Effects Regressions – OECD Log(AWW/N) on Log(GDP/N)  
 no. of observations = 120    no. of groups = 30 
Dependent Variable:  Log (AWW/N)   

























(Log(GDP/N))3   0.069 
(0.058) 
0.234 
R-squared (overall) 0.003 0.061 0.026 
Turning point  $8,775  
 
 
Table 1.6.    Fixed Effects Regressions – OECD Log(AWW/N) on Log(GDP/N) by Sector 
 Dependent Variable:  Log (AWW/N)


































0.354     
Log(GDP/N) 0.226 
(0.091) 
0.015      
4.061 
(1.132) 









0.114     
7.767 
(2.390) 























0.188 0.126             0.021 0.007 0.050   0.044 0.050 0.007 
Turning Point $19,088  $7,384  
No. of Obs./ 
No. of Groups 






4.2.2.  U.S. States Per Capita Withdrawals 
A second panel dataset uses figures from reports by the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) on withdrawals by state provided every five years between 1960 
and 2000.15  The regression model again is based on Equation 2 above, with state 
level fixed effects.  In this case, the dependent variable WATER represents the 
log of daily water withdrawals per capita (DWW/N) measured in million gallons 
per day.  The income variable INC is the log of per capita state personal income 
(SPI/N), obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2006), and 
adjusted by a state consumer price index provided by Berry et al (2003), to 
provide real income in constant 2000 dollars.   
 
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1.7.  As compared to OECD, the U.S. 
states exhibit less interstate variation in per capita income, but greater variation in 
per capita withdrawals.  As with the OECD case, the U.S. data also provide 
evidence of an EKC for per capita water withdrawals, as shown in Table 1.8.  The 
estimated turning point for the quadratic is at a real income of $18,620.  To see if 
the pattern was particular only to humid or arid states, the dataset was divided into 
two based on whether states are located east or west of the 100th meridian, with 
separate regressions run for each.16  Both cases follow an EKC.  In addition, 
separate time-series regressions were run for individual states following Equation 
3 below, where all symbols are identical to those in Equation 2.  Forty-four out of 
the forty-eight states display patterns consistent with an EKC (i.e., a negative 
coefficient on the income squared variable), although only in 15 cases are these 
coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level. This is likely due to the small 
number of observations – 9 time periods for each state.   
                                                 
15 These reports are listed as MacKihan and Kammerer (1962), Murray (1968), Murray and 
Reeves (1972, 1977), Solley et al (1983, 1988, 1993, 1998), and Hutson et al (2004).  Complete 
data was available only for the contiguous 48 states and Washington DC, and therefore the 
analysis included only these as units of observation.  The panel was balanced for per capita 
withdrawals but was unbalanced for all of the sectoral analysis. 
16 The 100th meridian is a common demarcation between the humid East and arid West (e.g., 
Stegner, 1954).  As is common in such East-West classifications, states through which the 100th 
meridian crosses were included with the Western states, as their climate and agriculture practices 




(Eq. 3)  WATERt = β0 + β1INCt + β2INC2t + β3INC3t + et 
 
In fixed effects regressions run by sector, statistically significant EKCs are found 
for all sectors other than irrigation (Table 1.9).  In the cases of public and 
industrial sector withdrawals, for which EKCs are found with both OECD and 
U.S. state datasets, the turning point at a somewhat higher income level for the 
U.S. data in both cases.  The U.S. results differ from those of the OECD’s in two 
significant ways.  First, in the case of irrigation, the U.S. data display a clear 
positive linear relationship,17 whereas the OECD data display no statistically 
significant relationship whatever.  This result is contrary to what a structural 
development theory would predict – i.e., a general movement away from water 
intensive agriculture and towards less water intensive service industries.  A 
second difference between the results is that per capita U.S. state withdrawals for 
coolant purposes in the thermoelectric industry display an EKC, whereas those for 
OECD nations do not.  In the U.S., the decline in water withdrawals for coolant 
purposes is probably attributable to the switch from open loop to closed loop 
technology, which occurred by the mid-1970s (DoE, 2006). A fixed effect 
regression of the coolant withdrawals using U.S. state data from 1980 forward, 
thus more comparable to the OECD data, does not display an EKC. 
 
In sum, parametric regressions find EKCs for national per capita water use in all 
datasets examined, though the non-parametric regressions in the case of the cross-
sectional data indicate that this may be imposed by choice of functional form.  
Results for per capita withdrawals by sector show less uniformity, differing 
significantly between datasets.  Results from the fixed effects regressions with the 
panel data provide seemingly stronger evidence of an EKC, but income in these 
regressions explains a small share of the variation in water withdrawals and is a 
poor indicator of individual country behavior. 
                                                 
17 The same results were found when using the log of per capita agricultural (irrigation plus 
livestock) withdrawals as a dependent variable.  The table above lists only irrigation so as to 





Table 1.7.  U.S. Panel Dataset Summary Statistics (1960-2000) 
 Number of states: 48    Time period covered: 1960-2000 at five year intervals 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SPI/N (2000 US$)  20,216.94 5,901.37   7,474   41,489 
DWW/N (gallons/day/capita) 2,372.35 3,633.86 131.95 23,560 
DWW (million gallons per day)  6,648.90 6,593.04 107.30   43,782 
 
 
Table 1.8.  Fixed Effects Regressions – U.S. Log(DWW/N) on Log(SPI/N) 
 no. of observations = 432    no. of groups = 48 
Dependent Variable:  Log (DWW/N)   
Independent Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Constant 5.974 
(0.628) 
0.000      
-125.057 
(14.637) 













(Log(SPI/N))2   -1.369 
(0.153) 




(Log(SPI/N))3   0.113 
(0.340) 
0.740 
R-squared overall 0.000 0.054                   0.052                 
Turning point  $18,620  
 
 
Table 1.9.  Fixed Effects Regressions – U.S. Log(DWW/N) on Log(SPI/N) by Sector 
 Dependent Variable:  Log (DWW/N)





















0.004     
-17.121 
(34.969) 
0.625     
19.447 
(1.192) 












0.000      
8.221 
(1.288) 
0.000      
0.820 
(0.138) 
0.000      
3.518 
(7.150) 
0.623     
-1.527 
(0.121) 
0.000     
53.798 
(5.567) 
0.000      
0.575 
(0.146) 
0.000      
32.860 
(7.243) 
0.000      





0.706     
 -2.826 
(0.284) 
0.000     
 -1.649 
(0.370) 
0.000     
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.200 0.223 0.004 0.005 0.153 0.219 0.000 0.010 






5. Total Water Withdrawals, Consumptive Use and Income 
 
This section extends the analysis of the previous section by presenting results of 
fixed effects regressions with panel data for total water withdrawals for the OECD 
countries and U.S. states and for total and per capita consumptive water use for 
the U.S. states.  Analysis of these additional measures of water use provides a 
robustness check for the results found in the previous section.  Such an extension 
is also of value, however, in that total water withdrawals and consumptive use 
may translate more directly into environmental impact than do per capita 
withdrawals.  Total withdrawals determine the extent to which natural systems are 
disturbed, and as much of the water withdrawn is not consumed and is available 
for reuse downstream, consumptive use of water – water withdrawn and not 
returned to the watershed – may provide a better indicator of scarcity and impact 
on the environment than do withdrawals.  Analysis of total withdrawals may also 
shed light on whether declines in per capita withdrawals occurred due to increases 
in water use efficiency, or simply due to population increases.   
 
5.1.  Total Water Withdrawals – OECD Nations and U.S. States  
 
Analysis of total withdrawal rates is of little use with cross-sectional data because 
of huge differences between nations in population, natural endowments, climate, 
etc.  As these differences can largely be accounted for with fixed effects 
regressions using panel data, regressions identical to those presented in the 
previous sections were run based on Equation 2 above, but using total 
withdrawals as a dependent variable instead of per capita withdrawals.   
 
For the OECD total water withdrawals, income and income squared are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the quadratic functional form (Table 
1.10).  The cubic functional form is also significant at the 5% level, however, 
suggesting that the downturn may be temporary.  Coefficients from the quadratic 
functional form indicate a turning point of just under $19,000, while estimates 
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based on the cubic form have water withdrawals reaching a peak (local 
maximum) at an income level of $10,547, at which point they decrease slightly, 
only to begin a subsequent increase (local minimum) at an income level of 
$21,199.   
 
As with per capita withdrawals, EKCs are found for the public and the industrial 
sectors, but not for irrigation or for coolant purposes (Table 1.12).  Jia et al (2006) 
did not find an EKC for OECD industrial withdrawals when using a fixed effects 
model, but did find that several OECD countries’ individual industrial water 
withdrawals followed an EKC type pattern.  The estimated turning point for the 
EKC for industrial withdrawals is at an income level of $9,123, a figure below the 
lower end of the range reported by Jia et al.  This may be simply due to use of 
different data sets, including the fact that Jia et al did not use data from several of 
the lower income OECD nations.  
 
For both industrial and public sector specific EKCs, the estimated turning point is 
higher for total withdrawals than for per capita. In the case of total public sector 
withdrawals, the estimated turning point for the EKC is roughly $36,217, as 
compared to a level of just over $19,000 for per capita withdrawals. This higher 
turning point is at the extremely high end of the range of observed data,18 and so 
this result should not be considered robust evidence of an EKC. 
 
Data from U.S. state withdrawals display a highly significant EKC, though the 
turning point was nearly $5,000 higher than in the case of per capita withdrawals 
(Table 1.11).  The cubic functional form is not significant for the U.S. data.  In 
time series regressions based on Equation 3 above, 41 out of 48 states had 
coefficients compatible with an EKC, although only 20 were statistically 
significant at the 5% level.   
 
                                                 
18 .  Only 4 observations had income higher than the estimated turning point: the 1995 and 2000 
per capita income of Luxembourg and the 2000 per capita incomes of Japan and Norway. 
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In terms of withdrawals by sector, total industrial and thermo-electric sector 
withdrawals display EKC patterns, both with estimated turning points at slightly 
higher income levels than those for per capita withdrawals (Table 1.13).  Total 
public withdrawals display a highly significant positive linear relationship with 
income, in contrast to per capita public sector withdrawals which appear to follow 
an EKC.  The signs on the coefficients of the quadratic functional form are 
consistent with an EKC; however, they are not statistically significant at the 5% 
level, and the predicted turning point using the estimated coefficients is at a per 
capita income level of over $400,000, well outside the sample range. These 
results are consistent with the empirical findings of others who found that water 
for domestic purposes (a large component of public use) has continued to grow, 
but at rates less than the rate of population growth (e.g., DoE, 2006).  Total 
irrigation withdrawals show a strong linear correlation with per capita income, 
much like the case of per capita irrigation withdrawals.   
 
In sum, analysis of total withdrawals tends to confirm the existence of an EKC in 
the case of U.S. states, although evidence from OECD nations suggests that any 
downturn may be minor and followed by a subsequent increase.  The difference 
between the two results may derive from water use for thermo-electric purposes, 
which displays an EKC in the U.S., but not in the OECD.  It may also simply 
reflect the longer time series of the U.S. data, as water use in the U.S. increased 
dramatically during the 1960-1975 period, whereas data from the OECD were 
only available from 1980 onward.  In all cases, in which an EKC was found, the 
estimated turning point for total withdrawals was higher than for the comparable 
per capita measure.  This may indicate that at least some of the downturn in per 
capita withdrawals is due to population increases rather than strictly due to 





Table 1.10.  Fixed Effects Regressions – OECD Log(AWW) on Log(GDP/N) 
 no. of observations = 120    no. of groups = 30 
Dependent Variable:  Log (AWW)   

























(Log(GDP/N))3   0.142 
(0.063) 
0.026 
R-squared (overall) 0.019 0.002 0.002 
Turning points                      $18,982 $10,547  (local maximum) 
$21,199  (local minimum) 
 
 
Table 1.11.  Fixed Effects Regressions – U.S. Log(DWW) on Log(SPI/N) 
 no. of observations = 432    no. of groups = 48 
Dependent Variable:  Log (DWW)   
Independent Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Constant 2.268 
(0.511) 
0.000      
-103.958 
(11.916) 
0.000      
58.871 
(263.137) 
0.823      
Log(SPI/N) 0.606 
(0.052) 
0.000      
22.337 
(2.436) 




(Log(SPI/N))2   -1.110 
(0.124) 
0.000     
4.902 
(8.128) 
0.547      
(Log(SPI/N))3   -0.205 
(0.277) 
0.460 
R-squared overall 0.047 0.070 0.071 





Table 1.12.  Fixed Effects Regressions – OECD Log(AWW) on Log(GDP/N) by 
Sector 
 Dependent Variable:  Log (AWW/N)











Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Constant 3.257 
(0.911) 






0.044     
20.709 
(15.801) 
0.194     
8.057 
(1.820) 
0.000     
-28.535 
(10.745) 
0.010     
4.310 
(3.463) 
0.218      
33.190 
(27.141) 
0.227     
Log(GDP/N) 0.434 
(0.095) 
0.000      
3.863 
(1.208) 
0.002      
0.188 
(0.264) 
0.479     
-3.201 
(3.401) 
0.350     
-0.115 
(0.192) 
0.550     
7.842 
( 2.314) 
0.001      
0.351 
(0.362) 
0.336     
-5.702 
(5.654) 
0.318     
(Log(GDP/N))2   -0.184 
(0.065) 
0.006     
 0.183 
(0.183) 
0.321     
 -0.430 
(0.125) 
0.001     
 0.316 
(0.294) 
0.288      
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.001 0.000 0.018 0.032 0.024       0.025 0.001 0.006         
Turning Point $36,217  $9,123  
No. of Obs. / 
No. of Groups 
115/29 98/27 98/27 80/22 
 
 
Table 1.13.  Fixed Effects Regressions – U.S. Log(DWW) on Log(SPI/N) by Sector 
Dependent Variable:  Log (DWW)












Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Constant -2.846 
(0.361) 
0.000     
-16.245 
(9.228) 
0.079     
-7.650 
(1.240) 
0.000     
3.867 
(31.752) 
0.903     
15.741 
(1.146) 
0.000     
-229.891 
(26.542) 
0.000     
-3.904 
(1.460) 
0.008     
-138.770 
(36.087) 
0.000     
Log(GDP/N) 0.889 
(0.037) 
0.000      
3.630 
(1.887) 
0.055     
1.306 
(0.126) 
0.000     
-1.050 
(6.492) 
0.872      
-1.042 
(0.116) 
0.000     
49.207 
(5.427) 
0.000      
1.048 
(0.148) 
0.000       
28.631 
(7.376) 
0.000       





0.717     
 -2.567 
(0.277) 






0.165 0.163 0.027 0.027 0.016 0.041 0.015 0.021 




5.2.  U.S. Consumptive Use  
 
A large share of water withdrawn is returned to the watershed and is available for 
reuse downstream.  In contrast, consumptive use of water is more directly bound 
by constraints of resource endowments, and may, therefore, be a better indicator 
than withdrawals of water scarcity and environmental impact.  Data on 
consumptive use are often not readily available, however.  Such data were 
available only in the USGS dataset and only for the years 1960-1995.   
 
For the U.S., per capita withdrawals and consumptive use are highly correlated 
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.796).  To test whether per capita 
withdrawals and consumptive use are reliable proxies for one another, a least 
squares regression of the logs of daily consumptive use per capita (DCU/N) was 
run on the logs of daily water withdrawals per capita (DWW/N).  An extremely 
strong, near linear relationship was found in the regression analysis (p<0.000), 
which suggests that withdrawals might be a reasonable indicator of consumptive 
use.  Several issues complicate such a straightforward conclusion, however.  As 
can be seen in Figure 1.2, the relationship between the logs of DCU/N on 
DWW/N is heteroskedastic and is weaker at lower levels of per capita 
withdrawals.   
 
The relationship between withdrawals and consumptive use also differs strongly 
across states.  For instance, for the entire time period of 1960-1995, consumptive 
use was only slightly more than 3% of total withdrawals in Illinois which relies 
primarily on rain-fed agriculture, while in Kansas, which has a much higher 
dependence on irrigated agriculture, consumptive use represented over 70% of 
withdrawals.  Differences in consumptive use rates are also evident across 
economic sectors.  In 1995, total withdrawals from all 48 states for irrigation and 
for thermo-electric plants were roughly equal at just above 130,000 mgd; 
however, consumptive use represented nearly 61% of irrigation withdrawals, but 
less than 3% of withdrawals for thermo-electricity purposes.  Moreover, these 
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ratios are not constant over time.  Consumptive use as a share of total withdrawals 
for the thermo-electric sector, for instance, increased 10-fold between 1960 and 
1995, as the power industry switched from open-loop to closed loop cooling 
systems (DoE, 2006).19  Industry and the public sector also displayed substantial 
changes over time, albeit less dramatic ones.  Thus, it seems that despite a strong 
correlation, data on withdrawals are not necessarily indicative of consumptive 
use.   
 
Separate fixed effects regressions were run following Equation 2, using both per 
capita consumptive use and total consumptive use as dependent variables. Results 
for per capita and total consumptive use are shown in Table 1.15.  For 
comparison, regression results for both per capita withdrawals and total 
withdrawals using only the 1960-1995 data are also presented.  Per capita 
consumptive use displays an EKC similar to the case of withdrawals, although 
with an estimated turning point at a slightly higher income level.  In the case of 
total consumptive use, however, while the data produce a statistically significant 
EKC, the estimated turning point is much higher than for total withdrawals, and is 
outside of the range of data.   
 
Separating the states by region, states west of the 100th meridian, which tend to 
have higher rates of consumptive use than their more humid eastern counterparts, 
did display a statistically significant (p<.05) EKC for total consumptive use with a 
turning point within the range of data, while the eastern states displayed a 
statistically insignificant (p>.10) EKC with a turning point far outside the range 
found in the data.  In running a regression on individual states using Equation 3, 
29 states had coefficients consistent with EKCs, although only 8 (5 western and 3 
eastern) of these were significant at the 5% level. 
 
                                                 
19 In 1975, for instance, U.S. withdrawals for the thermoelectric power sector were nearly 200,000 
mgd, while consumptive use was just over 800 mgd.  In 1995, withdrawals dropped to 130,000 
mgd, while consumptive use rose nearly four-fold to 3,300 mgd. 
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In sum, per capita consumptive use also seems to follow an EKC, although with 
an estimated turning point slightly higher than for per capita withdrawals.  For 
total consumptive use, the data are consistent with an EKC, but with a turning 
point outside the range of data.  This may be due to the change in technology in 
the thermo-electric coolant sector, which has allowed withdrawals to decline 
relative to the amount of water consumed.     
 
Figure 1.2.  Lowess of Log(DCU/N) on Log(DWW/N) 
 
 
Table 1.14. U.S. Panel Dataset Summary Statistics (1960-1995) 
 Number of observations: 48    Time period covered: 1960-1995 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SPI/N (2000 US$) 19,206.42 5,243.21 7,474 29,635 
DWW/N (gallons/day/capita 2,418.61 3,725.35 132.41 23,559.88 
DCU/N (gallons/day/capita) 806.56 1,458.93 8.99 7,953.17 
DWW (million gallons per day) 6,584.30 6,564.00 107.30 43,782.00 
DCU (million gallons per day) 1,832.73 3,477.44 7.72 25,495.63 
 
 
Table 1.15.  Fixed Effects U.S. Per Cap and Total Withdrawals & Consumptive Use 
 no. of observations = 384 no. of groups = 48 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Log (DWW/N) Log (DCU/N) Log (DWW) Log (DCU) 
Independent 
Variable 
























0.000   
Log(SPI/N) 0.269 
(0.089) 
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The primary objective of this study was to reassess the relationship between 
national and state level water use and income, given the limitations of previous 
studies on this topic.  In order to test the robustness of findings, several indicators 
of water use were utilized from multiple datasets.  In line with many early EKC 
studies, this study used only reduced form models to identify correlations between 
economic growth and water use.  As stated above, this limited analysis is the only 
type of water-income analysis possible at the national or state level, given data 
limitations.   
 
Many previous studies found EKCs for water withdrawals, either overall, or for 
specific sectors.  Results from GLS regressions of cross-sectional national per 
capita water withdrawals and for fixed effects regressions of OECD and U.S. 
panel data are generally consistent with the existence of an EKC.  As with 
findings in EKC pollution studies, however, the results of this study are sensitive 
to choice of dataset and method of analysis.  In fact, no measure of per capita 
water withdrawal was consistently found to follow an EKC across all datasets 
examined (see table 1.16).  Per capita withdrawals for all purposes were found to 
follow an EKC with all parametric regressions, but not with nonparametric 
regressions of the cross-sectional data, which indicated a monotonically positive 
relationship that seems to level off, but not decline.  This suggests that the turning 
point found with least squares may simply be an artifact imposed by choice of the 
quadratic functional form.    
 
Fixed effects regressions of panel data, both because they control for country 
specific factors such as water endowments and climate, and because they measure 
actual country behavior over time, are often felt to be better models for EKC 
studies.  Panel data covered a relatively short number of time periods, especially 
in the case of the OECD.  Still, even the relatively small datasets produced 
statistically significant results supporting an EKC for per capita water 
withdrawals.  Income explained very little of the variation in water use for all 
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datasets, however, and the estimated EKCs did not prove to be good predictors of 
individual country or state water use.   
 
Table 1.16.  Summary of Study Findings 
EKC found within sample range Estimated Turning Point  
of EKC 
FAO OECD U.S. FAO OECD U.S. 
GLS / Lowess 
Per capita withdrawals 
All Uses  Yes* / No Yes Yes 9,620 8,775 18,620 
Domestic  Yes / No 23,204 
Public Sector Yes Yes 19,088 29,792 
Agriculture / Irrigation Yes / Yes No No 1,953 
Industry No */ No Yes Yes 7,384 13,608 
Thermo-electric Cooling No Yes 21,239 
Total withdrawals 
All Uses     Yes* Yes 18,982 23,429 
Public Sector Yes No 36,217 
Agriculture / Irrigation No No 
Industry Yes Yes 9,123 14,538 
Thermo-electric Cooling No Yes 25,849 
Per Capita Consumptive Use Yes 19,593 
Total Consumptive Use Yes 33,649 
* Cubic function also statistically significant 
 
 
EKCs as described by quadratic functional forms present an inverted U 
relationship, but decreases in per capita water withdrawals cannot go on 
indefinitely (nor is there any reason to hope that it should). However, no 
consistent results for an upswing or stabilization after an initial downturn were 
found for per capita water withdrawals with either the OECD or U.S. datasets. 
This indicates, that the income level at which such a stabilization or upturn will 
occur has not yet been reached by a sufficient number of nations or states to 
produce statistical significance.  Evidence does suggest that OECD nations may 




Results from the cross-sectional and panel data differed in terms of the sectors 
primarily responsible for the downturn in per capita water withdrawals. 
According to the cross-sectional data it is agriculture, while the fixed effects 
regressions indicate industrial and public use.  A structural growth type 
explanation for an EKC might suggest that water use would increase as intensive 
agriculture develops and then drop if the economy moves away from agriculture 
and into less water intensive sectors such as services.  Such a theory is consistent 
with the results from the cross-sectional dataset, but not with the results from the 
fixed effects regressions, in which irrigation withdrawals (per capita and total) do 
not show a downturn, and, in the case of the U.S., appear to increase 
monotonically.   
 
Both OECD and U.S. industrial sector water withdrawals followed an EKC, 
measured both in per capita and total terms, the only sector to do so consistently.  
The cross-sectional analysis, however, shows per capita industrial withdrawals 
increasing monotonically with income.  While businesses in richer countries have 
been able to reduce their water use – largely as a result of water pricing policies 
and water treatment regulation – water use by the industrial sector in these 
countries is still significantly higher than in developing countries.  Thus, one can 
expect industries in developing countries to continue to increase their water 
withdrawals.   It is unclear, however, whether developing countries would be 
expected also follow an EKC with respect to industrial withdrawals, or whether 
they will adopt available water saving technologies already in use by industries in 
developed nations. 
 
That calculated turning points for total water withdrawals and consumptive use 
were higher than for per capita withdrawals suggests that some of the downturn in 
the case of the per capita regressions may simply be due to an increase in 
population.  In terms of environmental impact, total withdrawals are probably the 
more important indicator.  Water withdrawals and consumptive use in the U.S. 
were highly correlated at high levels of use, but less so at lower levels, suggesting 
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that the reliability of use of withdrawals as a proxy for consumptive use is limited.  
Calculated turning points for both per capita and total consumptive use were 
higher than the corresponding withdrawal measures, substantially so and out of 
sample range, for total use.  The higher turning point for consumptive use 
indicates that the intensity of water use (the ratio of consumptive use per unit 
withdrawn) has increased as states have developed economically. 
 
EKC studies are valuable for determining if a robust correlation exists between 
incomes and some environmental or natural resource indicator.  If so, income may 
be useful as a general indicator of future trends.  This is important for policy 
planning purposes and for anticipating future scarcity and environmental impacts.  
The research also has direct implications for limits to growth.  To the extent that 
EKCs exist, and peak withdrawals and consumptive use come before irreversible 
damage is done, constraints may not be binding.  If, however, those two 
conditions do not hold, then economic growth patterns would appear to be 
unsustainable in terms of water use.  Results from reduced form models testing a 
series of datasets are generally consistent with the existence of an EKC for water 
withdrawals and consumptive use, although results did differ across datasets and 
based on whether per capita or total use figures were used.  Income, however, 
proved to be a poor indicator of actual country and state water withdrawals.  This 
significantly tempers the usefulness of the EKCs found in the study in terms of 
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Virtual water trade and income: 
Is there an EKC for water footprints? 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Since its introduction in the mid-1990s, the term “virtual water”, meant to 
represent the amount of water used to produce a given agricultural commodity or 
industrial good, has become increasingly common in water policy discourse.  
Several researchers have attempted to measure the amount of virtual water traded 
internationally.  According to Chapagain et al (2005), virtual water traded 
internationally represents 16% of global water withdrawals.  Hoekstra and Hung 
(2002) and Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004) combined their calculations of net 
virtual water imports with data on withdrawals to produce national water 
footprints.  Thus, these water footprints are an attempt to measure the impact of 
nations’ consumption patterns on global water resources.20   
 
A separate body of research has investigated how national water withdrawals vary 
as a function of national income.  Several of these have claimed to find an 
inverted U curve relationship, or environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), for per 
capita water withdrawals and/or for sector specific water withdrawals (e.g., Rock, 
1998; Goklany, 2002; Jia et al, 2006; Katz, 2008a).  Recently a few researchers 
have addressed the relationship between virtual water use and income (e.g., 
Chapagain and Hoekstra, 2004; Ramirez-Vallejo and Rodgers, 2004; and 
Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2007).  Surprisingly, none, to this author’s knowledge, 
have attempted to relate their findings to the existing literature on environment 
and income, and none have explicitly tested the existence or lack thereof of an 
EKC for virtual water.   
 
                                                 
20 The term “water footprint” was intended to be analogous to that of ecological footprints, which 
attempt to measure the ecological impact of a given nation’s consumption patterns (Wackernagel 
and Rees, 1996). 
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This study analyzes national per capita water footprints as a function of per capita 
income, and explicitly tests for the existence of an EKC.  Such an analysis offers 
insight into the role that income plays in determining global water use patterns.  
Results indicate that the downturn found for water withdrawals as a function of 
income is, at least in part, offset by the tendency of richer countries to import 
more virtual water.  These results are consistent with a pollution haven 
explanation for EKCs, which proposes that at least some of the decline in 
pollution or resource consumption by economically developed nations is due to an 
outsourcing of these impacts to developing nations.  While no concrete 
conclusions can be made from this research as to whether or not the downturn in 
per capita withdrawals for richer countries is due to an increase in imported 
virtual water from developing nations, results seem to indicate that such a 
scenario may be a reasonable explanation. 
 
This study proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews some of the virtual water 
literature.  In particular, it focuses on discerning what exactly measurements of 
virtual water are attempting to measure and for what purposes.  Section 3 presents 
a brief review of the existing work on water withdrawals and income and on 
environmental Kuznets curves in general.  Section 4 is an empirical analysis of 
global water footprints as a function of income using least squares and 
nonparametric regression techniques.  Section 5 offers concluding remarks and 





2. Virtual Water and Water Footprints – What’s Being Measured 
 
The term “virtual water” was first used by Allan in the mid-1990s in discussions 
of efficiency in international water management (2002a).  The phrase gained 
popularity as an increasing number of water managers stressed that the scarcity 
value of water should be considered when promoting agricultural and trade 
policies.  Many scholars and professionals used the concept of trade in virtual 
water to stress that national water endowments need not be binding constraints on 
development.  Furthermore, amid predictions of impending crises and even 
violent conflict due to increasing water scarcity (e.g., Starr, 1991), some scholars 
stressed that  importation of virtual water offered an economically efficient way to 
alleviate local or national water scarcity and, thus, to avoid conflict (e.g., Allan, 
2002b).  
 
Since its inception, several researchers have attempted to quantify the amount of 
virtual water in international trade.  Some researchers have focused on a particular 
crop (e.g., Chapagain et al, 2006).  Others have looked at trade from a national or 
regional perspective (e.g., Earle, 2001; Guan and Hubacek, 2007; Velázquez, 
2007; Wichelns, 2001; Yang and Zehnder, 2002; Zhao et al, 2005).  Still others 
have attempted to analyze global trade in virtual water (e.g., Chapagain and 
Hoekstra, 2004; Hoekstra and Hung, 2002, 2005; Islam et al, 2007; Oki and 
Kanae, 2004; Ramirez-Vallejo and Rodgers, 2004; Yang et al., 2003; Yang and 
Zehnder, 2002; Zimmer and Renault, 2003).  Estimates of global virtual water 
trade differ based on which goods were included and the calculations and 
assumptions regarding water demands of production of these goods.  In one of the 
early such studies, Hoekstra and Hung (2002) offered an initial estimate that 
concentrated exclusively on trade in major agricultural commodities, as their 
production is responsible for over 80% overall global water withdrawals.  
Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004) expanded upon this by including water 
withdrawals necessary for production of industrial goods, which account for 




A list of the water requirements, or virtual water content, of some of commonly 
traded agricultural and industrial goods is provided in Table 2.1.21  The figures are 
average figures, as the water requirements of production of goods vary depending 
on climatic conditions and production methods.  A list of the top ten importers 
and exporters of virtual water for the period 1997-2001 are included in Table 2.2.  
As can be seen, the list is dominated by the large industrialized nations.  Because 
of the scale of trade, several nations, such as the United States, Germany, and 
China, are both among the largest importers and largest exporters.  A list of the 
top ten countries in terms of net imports and exports of virtual water for the same 
period is provided in Table 2.3.  Top net importing countries are almost 
exclusively high-income nations.  Five had a per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP/N) greater than US$ 20,000 in constant 2000 US$ for the period of 
reference, and only one, Iran, had a GDP/N less than $5,000.22  This contrasts 
sharply with the top ten virtual water exporters, of which six had a GDP/N of less 
than $5,000 and four had GDP/N of less than $1,000.   Such data indicate that 
income is likely an important driver of virtual water trade 
 
Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004) combine estimates of net imports (imports minus 
exports) of virtual water with data on water withdrawals to produce a measure of 
national “water footprints”.  Water footprints measure the amount of global water 
that a nation is responsible for via its consumption of agricultural and industrial 
goods, as well as through its domestic water use.  Net importation of virtual water 
via international trade allows some countries to consume types and quantities of 
goods beyond what their local water endowments would allow.  Other countries 
are net exporters of water, and therefore have footprints smaller than their 
withdrawal rates.  A list of per capita water footprints for selected nations is 
included in Table 2.4.  The countries with the largest per capita footprints are a 
mix of industrialized and developing countries, while those with the smallest per 
                                                 
21 For Tables 2.1-2.4, data are taken from Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004).   
22 Data on GDP/N from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007). 
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capita footprints are exclusively developing countries, with the exception of 
Latvia.  The calculations of water footprints allow researchers and policy-makers 
to determine the geographical distribution of the endpoints of global water 
withdrawals.   
 
 
Table 2.1  Virtual Water Content of Selected Products 
Product Virtual water content 
(liters) 
1 cup of tea (200 ml) 28 
1 glass of beer (200 ml) 60 
1 glass of apple juice (200 ml) 170 
1 glass of milk (200 ml) 200 
1 cup of coffee (200 ml) 224 
1 potato (100 g) 25 
1 orange (100 g)  50 
1 apple (100 g) 70 
1 slice of bread (30 g) 40 
Cheese(10 g) 50 
1 hamburger (150 g)  2400 
1 sheet of A4 size paper  10 
1 microchip (2 g)  32 
1 cotton T-shirt (medium size) 4100 
1 pair of leather shoes 8000 














1 USA 175.8 USA 229.3 
2 Germany 95.3 Canada 105.6 
3 Japan 98.2 France 78.5 
4 Italy 89.0 Australia 73.0 
5 France 72.2 China 73.0 
6 Netherlands 68.8 Germany 70.5 
7 UK 64.2 Brazil 67.8 
8 China 63.1 Netherlands 57.6 
9 Mexico 50.1 Argentina 50.6 
10 Belgium-
Luxembourg 
47.1 Russia 47.7 
Source: Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004).  Average figures in billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) 
for the period 1997-2001. 
 
 
Table 2.3.  Top Ten Net Virtual Water Importing and Exporting Countries 
Rank Net Virtual Water Imports 
(bcm/y) 
Net Virtual Water Exports 
(bcm/y) 
 Country Export Import Net 
Import
Country Export Import Net 
Export
1 Japan 98 7 92 Australia 73 9 64 
2 Italy 89 38 51 Canada 95 35 60 
3 UK 64 18 47 USA 229 176 53 
4 Germany 106 70 35 Argentina 51 6 45 
5 S. Korea 39 7 32 Brazil 68 23 45 
6 Mexico 50 21 29 Ivory 
Coast 
35 2 33 
7 Hong 
Kong 
28 1 27 Thailand 43 15 28 
8 Iran 19 5 15 India 43 17 25 
9 Spain 45 31 14 Ghana 20 2 18 
10 Saudi 
Arabia 
14 1 13 Ukraine 21 4 17 
Source: Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004).  Average figures in billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) 
for the period 1997-2001. Net figures differ slightly from gross figures due to rounding. 
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Table 2.4.  Ten Largest & Smallest Per Capita Water Footprints by Country 




1 USA 2,483 Yemen 619 
2 Greece 2,389 Botswana 623 
3 Malaysia 2,344 Afghanistan 660 
4 Italy 2,332 Somalia 671 
5 Spain 2,325 Ethiopia 675 
6 Portugal 2,264 Namibia 683 
7 Thailand 2,223 Latvia 684 
8 Sudan 2,214 China 702 
9 Cyprus 2,208 Kenya 714 
10 Guyana 2,113 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
734 
Source: Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004).  Average figures in cubic meters per capita per year 
(m3/cap/y) for the period 1997-2001. 
 
 
Water footprints, as defined by Chapagain and Hoekstra, are “the volume of water 
used in the production of the goods and services consumed by the inhabitants of 
the country” (2004:9).  The figures for agricultural crops include both “blue” and 
“green water”.  The term “blue water” represents ground and surface water 
extracted.  This figure is captured in the withdrawals figures.  The term “green 
water” represents moisture in the soil, utilized by crops directly, not through 
irrigation.  Green water is not represented in water withdrawal data, complicating 
comparisons between the withdrawals and footprints.  Because much of 
agriculture is rain-fed, however, not including green water would underestimate 
the virtual water embedded in crops.   
 
Water footprints, according the definition cited in the previous paragraph, are 
meant to represent the amount of water “consumed” by countries.  In calculating 
the virtual water content of products, Chapagain and Hoekstra use as 
measurement the amount of water withdrawals necessary for production.  They do 
not measure the consumptive use (the amount of water withdrawn and not 
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returned to the watershed) of product production.  In the case of many goods, 
especially industrial goods, the consumptive use can be a small share of the water 
withdrawn for its production.  Thus, the water footprint calculation represents the 
share of global water necessary for production of goods consumed, but not 
necessarily the water embedded in these goods.   
 
 
3. Water and National Income 
 
Income level has long been thought to influence the quantity of water consumed.  
Estimates of income elasticity of demand for water for domestic use are 
commonly made as part of standard demand curve estimation (for reviews of 
some such studies see Hanemann, 1998; Dalhuisen et al, 2001, 2003).  Income 
elasticity studies have generally not been expanded to cover other large water 
consuming sectors, namely agriculture and industry, however.  These sectors use 
water as an input rather than as a final good, and thus water demand for these 
sectors is generally modeled using profit maximization models, which assume 
that water is consumed at its rate of marginal productivity (Young, 2005), and not 
as a function of income.   
 
Relatively little published literature has examined the relationship between 
income and overall water use at the national level.  Of the few studies that have, 
several, though not all, found that national per capita water withdrawals follow an 
inverted U or EKC type relationship (e.g., Rock, 1998).23   Possible reasons for 
such a phenomenon include a) increasing returns to scale in water-saving 
equipment, especially irrigation equipment, b) a positive income elasticity of 
demand for environmental conservation or restoration, including for instream 
flows, c) structural change in which countries’ economies grow out of water 
                                                 
23 Rock (1998, 2001), Goklany (2002), and Katz (2008) find EKCs for national water withdrawals.  
Bhattarai (2004) finds an EKC for irrigated land in Asia. Jia et al (2006) find an EKC for 




intensive agriculture and industry and into less water intensive service sectors, 
and d) displacement of internal water withdrawals with imported virtual water. 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade predicts that countries with 
abundant endowments of factors of production will trade with those lacking in 
those factors of production (Ohlin, 1933; Heckscher et al, 1991).  Accordingly, 
one might expect water rich countries to export water intensive goods (or water 
itself) to more arid nations.  Research has not found this to be the case, however.  
Ramirez-Vallejo and Rodgers (2004) found that trade flows of virtual water trade 
are independent of water resource endowments, in contrast to the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem.  Yang et al (2003) and Oki and Kanae (2004) found that scarcity 
of arable land seems to play an important role in determining virtual water flows.  
Given that simple water endowment explanations do not satisfactorily explain 
trade in virtual water, it is interesting to discern what other drivers may be at 
work, and how they may be related to economic growth. 
 
A few researchers addressing virtual water trade have recently begun to look at 
the role that national income plays in explaining virtual water consumption 
patterns.  Ramirez-Vallejo and Rodgers (2004) find a positive elasticity of 
demand for virtual water in agricultural commodities.  Chapagain and Hoekstra 
(2004) find a positive correlation between overall national water footprints 
income, as well as for domestic and industrial sector water uses and income, but 
no clear relationship between agricultural sector footprints and income.  Hoekstra 
and Chapagain (2007) list income as one of four major drivers that they posit 
influence consumption of virtual water, and Berrittella et al (2007) include 
income in a general equilibrium model of virtual water trade in agricultural goods.  
None of these studies, however, relate their findings to those for water 
withdrawals mentioned above, nor do they test for the existence of an EKC 




None of the studies on virtual water relate their results to the pollution haven 
hypothesis mentioned earlier.24  Increased importation of virtual water as a 
function of income, may explain some of the observed downturns in per capita 
water withdrawals noted in the studies finding EKCs for water withdrawals.  It is 
within this context then, that this study seeks to further explore the connection 
between income and national water withdrawals and footprints.  
 
 
4.  Water Footprints and Income – An Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Data and Study Methods 
The dataset used in this study consists of estimates of national water withdrawals 
national water footprints, for the years 1997-2001 given by Chapagain and 
Hoekstra (2004), who, in turn, base their calculations on data on water 
withdrawals and international trade from the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization.  Data on withdrawals is available only as single point estimate for 
the 1997-2001 period, rather than yearly figures.  Because of this and because the 
time-series is quite short (5 years), this study takes an average of the annual 
footprints to construct a cross-sectional dataset, rather than treating the data as a 
panel dataset. Data on per capita income, also an average for 1997-2001, come 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 
2007).  Summary statistics for the dataset are presented in Table 2.5.   
 
Cross-sectional data offers only a snapshot in time.  Panel data would be 
preferable for an EKC study, as they show changes in individual country 
consumption over time.25  This would allow one to test, for instance, whether 
                                                 
24 Though the empirical evidence for a pollution haven effect remains inconclusive (Taylor, 2004; 
Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004),  some researchers have noted, that if true, the pollution haven 
hypothesis may be at least a partial explanation for the downturn in pollution observed in 
industrialized countries (Grossman and Kruger, 1995; Arrow et al, 1995; Copeland and Taylor, 
2004).   
25 While panel data is preferable, it is not without problems.  Several authors of EKC studies have 
pointed out that questions regarding stationarity, integration, homogeneity, and cross-sectional 
dependence of data can limit the reliability of conclusions based on panel data as well (e.g. List 
49 
 
declines in individual country withdrawals by rich nations were accompanied by 
increases in importation of virtual water withdrawals.  The short length of the 
time series, however, does not allow for such an analysis.  Changes in trade from 
year to year may be due simply to specific weather conditions in a given region 
for a particular year, and not reflective of a longer term trend.   
 
Several of the early EKC studies used simple least squares regression models, 
regressing some environmental indicator on per capita income and its square 
(some also included the cube of income) (e.g., Grossman and Kruger, 1991; 
1995).  Such reduced form models, as they are often called, are useful in 
identifying general correlations between income and the environmental indicator 
of choice.  Because they do not include other explanatory variables that may 
affect environmental impact or resource use, they do not isolate the effect of 
income holding other variables constant.  Rather, they capture both direct and 
indirect effects of income.  Later researchers included additional variables such as 
education and political governance structures likely also to affect environmental 
quality, but Seldon and Song (1994) argue that such variables were intentionally 
omitted from regression models because they were seen as endogenous to 
economic growth. Thus, if one is attempting to identify an overall income effect, 
including both direct and indirect impacts, a reduced form model is appropriate. 
  
The choice of whether to estimate a reduced form or a more comprehensive 
model should depend on the intended application of the research.  Identifying 
general correlations may be useful for highlighting and predicting trends, for 
instance; while isolating the direct contribution of income vis-à-vis other relevant 
variables may be more important for considering policy interventions.  Many 
EKC studies have not been clear about the intended application of their research, 
adding to confusion in interpretation of results (Katz, 2008).  This research will 
                                                                                                                                     
and Gallet, 1999, Stern, 2004; Bradford et al, 2005; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2005; Muller-
Furstenberger and Wagner, 2007).  Furthermore, if fixed effects models are being utilized, results 
can be biased and inconsistent if country specific characteristics are correlated with income 
(Chimeli and Braden, 2006). 
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use a reduced form Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression model.  As such, 
it is evaluating only a general correlation between income and withdrawals and 
footprints.  
 
The regression model used in this study is given in Equation 1 below: 
 
(Eq. 1)  WATERi = β0 + β1INCi + β2INCi2 + β3INCi3 + ei 
 
where the dependent variable WATER represents either the per capita annual 
water withdrawals or per capita water footprint, depending on the specific 
regression estimated; INC represents per capita Gross Domestic Product;  e 
represents an error term; the subscript i represents the unit of observation - an 
individual country; and the βs represent parameters to be estimated.  As is 
common in EKC studies (Stern, 2004), the natural logs of both the dependent and 
independent variables are used as units of analysis, rather than the levels.  This 
serves two valuable functions.  First, it helps smooth out a highly skewed 
distribution of national per capita incomes.  Second, coefficients on log-log 
regressions can be easily interpreted as income elasticities of demand.26  
 
Separate regressions are run for per capita withdrawals and footprints.  Additional 
regressions are run for per capita withdrawals and footprints by sector.  In 
addition to GLS regression, Lowess,27 a non-parametric regression technique, 
analysis is also performed on the data.  Lowess regression forms a best fit curve 
by conducting localized regressions over small, overlapping subsets of the data, 
often called bin size or bandwith.  The primary advantage of this method is that it 
estimates a best fit curve to data without necessitating any prior assumptions 
regarding functional form (DiNardo and Tobias, 2001).  Such regressions do not 
produce functions easily represented by mathematical formulae, but can better 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that these income elasticities of demand are not equitable to those from 
traditional demand curve estimates, which do, in fact, isolate the effect of income with respect to 
other explanatory variables. 
27 LOWESS is sometimes referred to by other names, including LOESS and locally weighted 
polynomial regression (NIST, 2006). 
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represent the actual relationship between variables.   The Lowess regressions will 




4.2.1. Per Capita Annual Water Withdrawals and Income 
Several EKC studies simply test a quadratic equation (income and income 
squared as explanatory variables), without testing alternative functional forms.  In 
this study the logs of per capita annual water withdrawals (AWW/N), measured in 
cubic meters per capita per year, were regressed on linear, quadratic, and cubic 
functions of the logs of income, represented by per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP/N) in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  Results of GLS regressions are 
presented in Table 2.6.   
 
All three functional forms were statistically significant at the 1% level.  The linear 
equation shows a monotonically increasing function; the quadratic, an inverted U 
or EKC equation, with a turning point at $7,158; and the cubic a function that 
increases with income up to a level of $1,825 per capita, after which there beings 
a slight decline, followed by an increase at a per capita income above $7,775.  
These results differ from those of Rock (1998), whose GLS results confirm only 
an EKC type function, with a turning point per capita income of roughly $20,000. 
Rock’s analysis differed from the current analysis, however, in terms of year of 
data, sample size, and model functional form.  The results are also slightly 
different than those found by this author (Katz, 2008) using an identical model, 
but slightly different sample size (n=149).28  In that analysis, the quadratic form 
was significant at the 1% level, but the coefficients on the square and cube of 
GDP/N in that analysis were significant only at the 10% level.  This is evidence to 
the fact that results are sensitive to datasets, a finding similar to those in other 
EKC studies. 
                                                 
28  The slightly different sample sizes result from limitations regarding trade data used by 




A Lowess regression of AWW/N on GDP/N produces a monotonically increasing 
relationship.29  A graph of the fitted curve based on the quadratic and cubic 
models, together with the results of the Lowess regression, are presented in Figure 
2.1a.   As can be seen, while results from a least squares regression using a 
quadratic form are consistent with the finding of an EKC, results from the cubic 
form and the Lowess regression demonstrate that the turning point found with the 
quadratic is simply an outcome of the choice of functional form.   
 
GLS regressions of AWW/N were also estimated by sector for the agricultural, 
domestic use, and industrial sectors.   Domestic withdrawals conform to an EKC, 
industrial withdrawals increase monotonically with respect to income, and 
agricultural withdrawals rise, then fall, only to rise again at high income levels 
(Table 2.7).  For both the domestic and agricultural withdrawals, the estimated 
turning points (local maxima and minima respectively) are quite close to the 
upper end of the range of data.  Lowess regressions of the sectoral data show that 
these estimated turning points may not reflect of actual trends (Figures 2.1b-d), 
rather, they may simply be artifacts imposed by choice of functional form, as was 
found in the case of per capita annual withdrawals for all purposes.  The 
somewhat lower per capita water withdrawals in the agricultural sector (by far the 
largest water consuming sector) in rich countries are what drive the findings of 
EKCs for overall withdrawals.  According to both the quadratic and cubic 
functional forms, per capita industrial withdrawals increase with respect to 
income, but at a decreasing rate, while the Lowess regression shows them 
increase at an increasing rate for the richest countries.  All regressions show that 
industries in richer countries tend to use more water, on a per capita level, than 
those in poorer countries.  This is the case despite research showing significant 
reductions in industrial water use in developed countries over the past several 
decades (e.g., Jia et al, 2006).   
                                                 
29 LOWESS regressions in this study used a bandwith of 0.8.  Regressions using other bandwidths 




4.2.2. Per Capita Annual Water Footprints and Income 
Log-log regressions of per capita footprints on per capita income do not show 
evidence of an EKC.  Of the three functional forms tested, only the linear form is 
statistically significant at any meaningful level (Table 2.8).  Poorer countries 
display a much wider range of both per capita withdrawals and per capita 
footprints than do richer countries.  Whereas per capita withdrawals appear to 
level off as a function of income, per capita footprints for such countries appear to 
increase throughout the range of the data.  Income accounts for less of the 
variation in footprints than for withdrawals, however, as indicated by the lower R2 
values in all models. 
 
It is tempting to simply compare per capita footprints to per capita withdrawals in 
order to determine the extent to which countries are importing virtual water to live 
beyond their own endowments.  However, given that “global virtual water export 
is overwhelmingly ‘green’” (Yang et al, 2006a:14), it is not possible to simply 
compare agricultural or overall withdrawals and footprints in order to determine 
the degree to which water withdrawn is traded across boundaries.   
 
Per capita industrial withdrawals and per capita footprints are comparable though.  
Both GLS and Lowess regressions show that industrial footprints increase 
monotonically with respect to income.  In fact, all three functional forms and the 
Lowess regressions results provide very similar results (Table 2.8 and Figure 
2.2c).  Moreover, the high R-squared for all three functional forms indicates that 
income accounts for a great deal of the variation among nations.  Per capita 
footprints rise at a substantially higher rate with respect to income than do 
withdrawals, indicating that, at least in terms of consumption of industrial goods, 
consumption in richer nations does, in fact, come at the expense of water 
withdrawn in poorer nations.  Per capita withdrawals of the richest quintile in the 
sample are 251.7 m3/cap/year, while those of the poorest quintile are 24.9; a ratio 
of just over 10.1.  The comparable figures for industrial water footprints are 406.9 
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and 20.6 m3/cap/year; a ratio of just under 19.8, nearly double that of industrial 
withdrawals.  As industrial withdrawals constitute 22.3% of virtual water traded 
globally, it seems that a substantial share of the world’s water is being directed 
from poorer countries towards richer ones in the form of industrial goods.   
 
Chapagain and Hoekstra divide up nations’ overall water footprints into internal 
and external footprints, where the “internal water footprint of a nation is the 
volume of water used from domestic water resources to produce the goods and 
services consumed by the inhabitants of the country. The external water footprint 
of a country is the volume of water used in other countries to produce goods and 
services imported and consumed by the inhabitants of the country” (2004:9).   
Regressions of internal and external footprints on income offers another method 
of evaluating the extent to which economic development correlates with 
utilization of global water resources.  Log-log regressions of per capita internal 
water footprints and external water footprints on GDP/N reveal that internal water 
resource footprints decline with respect to income, while external water footprints 
increase monotonically (Table 2.9 and Figure 2.3a-b).30  Moreover, the effect of 
income is greater on external water footprints than internal ones.  Thus, at least on 
a per capita basis, wealthier countries rely less of their own water resources and 
more on those of other countries.31   
 
Income accounts for a substantial share of the variation in external footprints, as 
evidenced by the R-squared figures (Table 2.9).  Moreover, income accounts for a 
much higher share of the variation in external footprints than internal ones.  Thus, 
income level seems to be a better predictor of increasing importation of water 
resources than of decreasing domestic water resources 
                                                 
30 This is the case for internal footprints both including and excluding domestic water 
consumption, as this sector represents just 6.4% of total internal water footprints.  A graphical 
presentation of internal water footprints including the domestic use sector is not included in Figure 
3, as it is nearly identical to that of Figure 3a. 
31 This said, internal water footprints are still substantially larger that external ones.  Average per 
capita internal footprints for the sample are 1011.4 m3/cap/year, while average per capita external 




Table 2.5.  Annual Water Withdrawals and Footprints (1997-2001 Averages)   
Variable Mean     Std. Dev.     Min         Max 
GDP (billions of 2000 US$) 222   9.32 0.04 9,340 
GDP Per Capita (2000 US$) 5,546   8,737 91.12 37,036 
Annual Water Withdrawals  (km3) 27.1 86.3 .02 633.3 
Annual Water Withdrawals Per Capita (m3) 575.1 645.5 5.42 4743.2 
Annual Water Footprint  (km3)  52.8   134.2 0 987.4 
Annual Water Footprint Per Capita (m3) 1349.0 442.3 619 2483 
Sources: Chapagain and Hoekstra (2004), FAO (2007), World Bank (2007).   
Number of observations (n) = 134 
 
 
Table 2.6.  GLS Regressions of Log (AWW/N) on Log (GDP/N) 
 
Note: Coefficient results are presented with robust standard errors in parenthesis and p-values 
below the standard errors.  Annual water withdrawals per capita are in cubic meters. GDP per 
capita is in 2000 US$.  n=134. 
  
 
Independent Variable Linear Quadratic Cubic 
Constant 3.650 
(0.590) 
0.000   
-3.004 
( 2.541) 
0.239   
-30.026 
(10.137) 
0.004   





0.002   
13.419 
(4.134) 
0.001   
Log (GDP/N)2  -0.119   
(0.040) 




Log (GDP/N)3   0.067 
(0.023) 
0.005 
R-squared  0.115 0.166 0.202 




Table 2.7  GLS Regressions of Log (AWW/N) on Log (GDP/N) by Sector 
 
2.1a.  AWW/N – All Uses   2.1b.  AWW/N – Agriculture 
 
2.1c.  AWW/N – Domestic   2.1d.  AWW/N – Industrial 
 
Figure 2.1a-d.  Fitted GLS and Lowess Curves of Log(AWW/N) on Log(GDP/N)  
 Note: Fitted curves from GLS regressions are provided only in cases in which the model 
was statistically significant at the 10% level or less.   
  
 Agriculture (n=130) Domestic (n=134) Industry (n=131) 
Independent 
Variable 












0.561   
-5.817 
(1.505) 
0.000   
-4.815 
(6.976) 
0.491   
 -2.820 
(0.646) 
0.000   
-8.584 
(2.698) 















0.000   
2.045 
(0.394) 
0.000   
1.625   
(2.847) 
0.569   
0.794 
(0.080) 






0.001   
Log (GDP/N)2  -0.211 
(0060) 
0.001    
-1.930 
(0.825) 
0.021   
 -0.100 
(0.025) 
0.000   
-0.043 
(0.376) 
0.909   
 -0.102 
(0.046) 
0.027   
-2.367 
(0.715) 
0.001   
Log (GDP/N)3   0.075 
(0.036) 
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2.2a. Footprints per Capita – All Uses 
2.2b. Footprints per Capita – Agriculture  2.2c. Footprints per Capita - Industry 
 
Figure 2.2a-c.  Fitted GLS and Lowess Curves of Log(Footprints/N) on Log(GDP/N) 
 Note: Fitted curves from GLS regressions are provided only in cases in which the model 
was statistically significant at the 10% level or less.   
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2.3a. Internal Footprints/N           2.3b. External Footprints/N 
 
Figure 2.3a-b.  Fitted GLS and Lowess Curves of Internal and External Water 
Footprints/N on GDP/N (Log-Log)  
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5.  Conclusion 
 
Some research has suggested that per capita water withdrawals follow an inverted 
U or EKC type form.  Whereas water withdrawals represent a production aspect 
of water used to produce goods, water footprints represent a consumption aspect, 
in that they relate to the ultimate destination of those goods at the point of 
consumption.  This research shows that differences between footprints and 
withdrawals with respect to income are significant.  The two indicators are not 
directly comparable as footprints include both “green” and “blue” water.  
However, results from analysis of overall footprints, industrial sector footprints, 
and the differences between internal and external footprints all indicate that 
wealthier countries are responsible for more of the world’s water resources 
consumption than for its extraction.   
 
Because this study uses only cross-sectional data, it cannot confirm or refute a 
pollution haven type explanation, whereby wealthy countries decrease their 
extraction of water resources by increasing consumption of water intensive goods 
from poorer countries.  The study’s results are, however, consistent with the 
contention that such an outsourcing of water production is occurring.  Panel 
datasets of national water withdrawals and water footprints over time, which 
could better address this research question, have yet to be published.    
 
The results of this research are not only important from a perspective of equitable 
resource use, but as countries industrialize, it is valuable to be able to predict the 
impact of economic growth on consumption habits, and to understand how these 
consumption habits are likely to impact water withdrawals.  Water withdrawals, 
while not strictly constrained by water endowments the way consumptive use is, 
impact the environment, and a certain level of withdrawals is necessary for basic 
economic development.  If, as seems the case based on the results of this research, 
income increases a country’s use of external water resources, new research 
questions arise concerning the limits to such outsourcing, as eventually 
60 
 
developing countries will not have additional external water resources from which 
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Hydro-political hyperbole:  
Examining incentives for exaggerating the risks of water wars 
 
1. Introduction  
Predictions of coming wars over water are commonly found in statements by 
political officials, research studies by academics, popular journalistic sources, and 
reports by environmental and development oriented non-governmental 
organizations.  A search on any popular search engine of the term “water wars” 
will turn up thousands of such references.  Claims by analysts regarding the 
possibility of future water wars range from those who present such a scenario as a 
possibility which can be avoided with cooperation and proper planning (e.g., Frey 
and Naff, 1984, Postel and Wolf, 2001), to those who predict that such wars are 
likely (e.g., Cooley, 1984; Naff and Matson,1984; Starr, 1991; Bulloch and 
Darwish, 1993; De Villiers 1999, Ward 2002), to those who confidently predict 
that they are “certain” (e.g., Myers, 1993:47).  
 
Many authors buttress their claims by quoting high level officials such as former 
Egyptian Foreign Minister and former Secretary General of the United Nations 
Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, who purportedly claimed that “The next war in the 
Middle East will be fought over water, not politics” or the vice president of the 
World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, who stated that “the wars of the next century will 
be over water.”32  As will be shown, several of those making the case that water 
will lead to violent conflict offer case studies of past water related conflict, and 
more recently, a few have provided statistical analyses showing some evidence 
that water scarcity is correlated with the outbreak of both domestic and 
international conflict.  
 
Since the first publication of such warnings of the imminent potential for violent 
conflict over water, however, a mounting literature has challenged both the 
                                                 




empirical and theoretical foundations of such a water war hypothesis (Lonergan 
2001; Dolatyar 2002; Wolf 2007).  Critics note, for instance, that relatively little 
systematic empirical evidence exists of violent conflicts over water (Yoffe et al, 
2003), and that the evidence that does exist is inconclusive at best. Furthermore, 
they note that proponents of the water war hypothesis often rely on a very limited 
number of cases and statements by officials (Dinar, 2002).  In addition, as will be 
discussed more at length below, several researchers have offered theoretical 
arguments based on strategic, economic, and technological rationales, suggesting 
that the risk of violent conflict over water resources is highly exaggerated.  
 
Given the relative paucity of supporting evidence of past water-motivated 
conflict, and theoretical arguments why they are unlikely, it is then perhaps 
surprising that proclamations that water wars are imminent remain so prevalent.  
While much of the literature on the topic has attempted to either promulgate, 
refute, or in some other way test the veracity of the water war hypothesis, little if 
any has addressed the various incentives that different key actors have for 
emphasizing, and even exaggerating, the risks of such wars.  This article will 
attempt to address this gap.  It will describe incentives that each of several 
different actors face to stress the possibility of violent conflict over scarce water 
resources.  The confluence of interests by different parties to stress such risks is 
likely to have contributed to the persistence of such warnings and predictions in 
political, academic, and journalistic circles at levels far beyond what is justified 
by empirical data.  While this article specifically addresses violent conflict over 
water, its premises and conclusions are likely relevant to much of the discourse in 
the rapidly developing field of environmental security.  
 
The article will proceed as follows.  The next section will specify what is meant 
by “water wars” and violent conflict over water for the purposes of this 
discussion.  It will then lay out the main arguments for and against the water war 
hypothesis, and provide a review of empirical studies on the matter.  The 
subsequent sections will outline incentives for stressing the risks of war over 
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water resources by five different actors involved in promulgating the water war 
hypothesis: political officials, journalists, academics, non-governmental 
organizations, and the private sector.  The final section will offer concluding 
thoughts and implications for analysis of other aspects of environmental and 
resource security.  
 
2. The Water War Hypothesis: Examining the Evidence  
 
2.1. Defining Water-based Conflict  
Beginning in the 1980s, a flurry of academic articles were published predicting 
that growing water scarcity would lead to increasing international conflict (e.g., 
Cooley, 1984; Naff and Matson, 1984; Starr and Stoll, 1988).  Several of these 
quoted leading international figures such as former Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat and Foreign Minister Boutrous Boutrous Ghali.  These predictions and 
warnings were duly repeated in the international news media (e.g., Asser, 2007; 
Cowell, 1989; Vesilind, 1993) and in publications of international development 
organizations (e.g., UN, 2006; WCED, 1987).  Over the last two decades, the 
number of articles in academic journals and the popular press referring to 
imminent water wars increased exponentially; and the water war hypothesis, as it 
is sometimes called, has become a cornerstone in the burgeoning literature linking 
the natural environment and security.  
 
Before delving into the arguments supporting and refuting the likelihood of 
“water wars”, it is helpful to define the term.  Perhaps because of its alliterative 
value, the expression “water wars” is often used to describe any level of conflict 
between parties involving water.33  Clearly such a loose use of the term is not 
helpful for the current analysis.  Singer (1981) notes that most studies of war fail 
                                                 
33 For instance, a search of the New York Times online archives (1981-2007) using the keywords 
“water war” produced 34 articles, only 4 of which actually mentioned actual or potential violent 
conflict of any sort (performed using online database at: http://query.nytimes.com/search/ on 6 
February, 2008).  Several books also have the phrase “Water Wars” in the title, but do not focus 
on violent conflict over water resources (e.g., Annin (2006) on the history of U.S.-Canadian water 
management in the Great Lakes).   
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to distinguish between war, which is uncommon, and conflict, which is more 
common.  Of concern for this article is the potential for armed conflict between 
politically organized groups over control over or access to freshwater resources, 
as this is a meaning commonly used by both proponents and detractors of the 
water war hypothesis.  Thus, both domestic and international armed conflict could 
be considered under such a definition, but violent conflict between individuals 
would not, nor would conflict over other issues in which water infrastructure was 
damaged.  In this sense, this paper is not restricting itself to wars per se, but 
rather, a broader range of violent conflict stemming from water-related issues.  
 
2.2. Arguments Supporting the Water War Hypothesis  
Support for the water war hypothesis is given by declarations of public officials, 
theoretical models, and empirical evidence.  In addition to the numerous quotes of 
Sadat, Boutrous Ghali, and Serageldin already mentioned, other commonly cited 
figures warning of the risks of water wars include former United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Anan, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
(both cited in Amery, 2002), the late King Hussein of Jordan who made a warning 
similar to that of Sadat (Starr, 1991), and former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon, who, in his autobiography, claimed that the Six Day War of 1967 actually 
“started two and a half years earlier,” with Israel’s bombing of Syria’s attempted 
diversion of the Jordan headwaters (Sharon and Chanoff, 1989: 167), and who, 
decades later, made declarations that upstream use of the headwaters of the Jordan 
River within Lebanon could again lead to war (Amery, 2002).  
 
The potential for water wars was included in Our Common Future, the Bruntland 
Report on sustainable development (WCED, 1987), and figured prominently in a 
book written by former U.S. Senator Paul Simon on the challenges of water 
supply around the world (Simon, 1998).  Starr (1991) claims that already in the 
1980s, U.S. intelligence services had a list of ten areas in the world in which the 




The typical version of the water war hypothesis posits that countries will be 
willing to wage war over threats to existing water resources that may arise, for 
instance, from upstream diversions.  Some of the more developed of theoretical 
models incorporate additional explanatory variables such as riparian position, 
relative military might, measures of relative scarcity, and level of economic 
development (e.g., Frey and Naff, 1984; Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998).  A stronger 
version of the water war hypothesis claims that countries experiencing acute 
water scarcity will be compelled by a “hydrological imperative” to obtain 
additional water supplies from neighboring countries, and will resort to violent 
means if needed (e.g., Cooley, 1984; Stauffer, 1982; Stork, 1983).  
 
Still other theoretical models stress that water scarcity alone may not in and of 
itself often serve as a casus belli between nations, but rather, may aggravate 
existing international or domestic conflicts (e.g., Gleick, 1991).  Water scarcity 
may, for instance, result in population displacement (“environmental refugees”), 
leading to competition and political destabilization (Homer-Dixon, 1994). 
Similarly, droughts may reduce returns from agricultural labor, thereby improving 
the relative returns from initiation of violent competition between groups or 
revolt, and as such may be a contributing factor to wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002).  Water scarcity may be a result of a number of factors, including internal 
population increases, increased use by other riparian nations, increased per capita 
demand due to changes in standards of living, decreases in quality of available 
resources, or unequal access to available resources (Homer-Dixon, 1994).  In 
addition, the impacts of climate change on water availability may also contribute 
to local water scarcity, raising the potential for conflict (Van der Molen and 
Hildering, 2005).34  These theoretical constructs are in line with the larger 
literature on environmental security.35  
                                                 
34 A special issue of Political Geography, Volume 26, Issue 6, (2007) was dedicated to the links 
between conflict and climate change. Some articles in this issue addressed the effect on 
precipitation as a driver. 
35 Although deriving from a different theoretical construct, violent protest over privatization of 
water resources has also been described as a form of “water war” in some of the literature (e.g., 




By far, the majority of the empirical evidence presented in support of the water 
war hypothesis consists of case studies and anecdotal references.  Among the 
most popular are Israel’s bombing of Syrian bulldozers attempting to divert the 
headwaters of the Jordan River and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s 
(PLO) attempt to blow up Israel’s National Water Carrier (e.g., Naff and Matson, 
1984; Starr, 1991; Gleick, 1993; Lowi, 1993).  While the Middle East is the most 
cited example, other regions have also been cited as having experienced violent 
conflict over water.  Most recently, skirmishes in Sri Lanka have been described 
as water-related (Bajpaee, 2006; The Economist, 2006; Reddy, 2006), and several 
commentators, including U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, have 
characterized the violence in the Darfur region of Sudan as stemming, at least in 
part, from struggles over scarce water resources (Ban, 2007). 
  
Until relatively recently, the water war hypothesis lacked any systematic 
empirical support.  Over the past few years, however, several researchers have 
published large sample size statistical studies on the subject (although such work 
still pales in comparison to that relying on a few case studies).  In one of the first 
such studies, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) found water scarcity to be statistically 
correlated with the outbreak of civil wars between 1980 and 1992 and with armed 
conflict within nations between 1989 and 1992.  Gleditsch et al (2006) found that 
dry countries have more conflict than humid ones.  Toset et al (2000) and Furlong 
et al (2006) found that, holding other variables constant, countries that share a 
river are more likely to engage in violent conflict than neighboring countries that 
do not, and the higher the number of rivers, the higher the likelihood of conflict.  
Levy et al (2005) found that regions with high levels of variability in rainfall were 
statistically more prone to high (but not to low) intensity domestic conflict.  
Miguel et al (2004) also found a correlation between rainfall and violent conflict 
within Africa.  Both Furlong et al (2006) and Hensel et al (2006), while noting the 
small number of militarized disputes over rivers, nonetheless found that 
71 
 
militarized conflict over rivers is more likely when an initiating state is 
experiencing greater water scarcity.  
 
2.3. Arguments Against the Water War Hypothesis  
Despite the proliferation of articles and research supporting a water war 
hypothesis, a substantial amount of research demonstrates that actual risks of the 
outbreak of violent conflict over water resources may be minimal.  In a critique of 
the environmental security literature, Gleditsch (1998) decried the fact that 
“postulated events in the future are cited as empirical evidence” (p. 381). Clearly 
statements from the 1980s and 1990s that claimed that “the next war in the 
Middle East will be over water, not politics” have already proven to be wrong.  
Research has shown, however, that even the more general predictions of 
imminent water wars based on comments by officials may lack credibility.  
Warnings and even threats of water wars by public officials are commonplace, 
and are often considered critical evidence of the potential for water related 
violence, but it is important to distinguish between threats of conflict and actual 
conflict.  Leng (1980), for instance, found no correlation between frequency of 
threats of war and the onset of war.  In a study specifically looking at conflict and 
cooperation over water resources between 1948 and 1992, Yoffe et al (2003) 
noted over 400 incidents of verbal exchanges by political figures between 1948 to 
1999 that were conflictive in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict of 
varying levels of intensity (most from the Middle East), and no all-out wars. 
 
Much of the theoretical justification for water wars is simplistic and deterministic.  
Singer (1981) claims that at least three sets of attributes need to be considered 
when analyzing the background conditions for causes of war: material 
(geographic, demographic, and technological), structural (institutional and 
organizational), and cultural (including psychological).  Most theories on water 
wars, however, are based exclusively on the material attributes, ignoring broader 
institutional and cultural factors.  Studies of war, such as the numerous research 
projects using the Correlates of War database (Singer, 1980), have identified 
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numerous variables that seem to influence the likelihood of the outbreak of 
violent conflict, including level of democracy, relative power parity, economic 
development and others (e.g., Vasquez, 2000).  Yet, notes Singer, in a history of 
empirical research on war, “many popular models reduce war to single 
deterministic causes” (2000: p.17).  This seems to be the case for many of the 
proponents of the water war hypothesis, especially those promulgating a 
hydrological imperative line of reasoning.36  Theories based on water scarcity as a 
single driver ignore other clearly important variables and enabling conditions such 
as historical relationships between parties, riparian position, relative military 
balance of power, governance and decision-making structures, trade relationships, 
and others.  Theoretical models that have attempted to incorporate some of these 
additional variables still remain largely untested.  
 
Another critique of the conclusion that water wars are imminent comes largely 
from economists, who point out that the economic value of water to be gained 
from military conquest is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military 
preparation and battle, much less the loss of life (e.g., Allan, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; 
Deudney, 1999; Fisher, 1995; Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2005).  While proponents of 
water war scenarios often premise their conclusion on the fact that water is 
essential for life and non-substitutable (e.g., Elhance, 1999) – and therefore likely 
to be fought over – others have noted that water for basic needs represents a small 
share of total water use, even in arid countries (Gleick, 1996; Toset et al, 2000).  
The majority of freshwater consumption (over 80% of world withdrawals) is by 
the agricultural sector, a relatively low value use and one in which large gains in 
efficiency could easily be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of 
crops.  Thus, economists and others have made the argument that a war over 
water is really a war over water for agricultural goods of little economic value.  
Furthermore, they argue that markets provide a cheaper and morally superior 
                                                 




alternative means of attaining either the water or the agricultural goods.37  Allan 
(2001; 2002a, 2002b) has stressed that countries can obviate the need for conflict 
over water by importing, rather than growing, water intensive crops (what he 
dubbed importation of ‘virtual water’).  Some economists argue that even if water 
is valued at its replacement cost – the cost of desalination plus delivery – rather 
than at its shadow price, it would still be cheaper than the costs of waging war, 
and with no loss of life (e.g., Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2005).  
 
Of course, most political leaders do not view water as merely an economic good, 
but rather, one that has important implications in terms of national identity, 
sovereignty, and environmental quality.  Moreover, realists note that leaders 
rarely if ever decide to wage war based on arguments of economic efficiency; 
indeed, history is replete with examples of wars that made little sense from an 
economic perspective.38  Decision-makers’ assessments of benefits and costs 
often differ substantially from those of the market.  The economic argument 
against water wars is valuable, however, in stressing that most uses of water are 
not essential, and therefore, fighting over water is rarely necessary for survival. 
Furthermore, the more policy-makers learn the economists’ arguments, the lower 
the chances of water based conflict.  
 
Perhaps the strongest case against the probability of water wars is the lack of 
systematic empirical evidence for precedents.  Gleick (2006) lists several 
incidents of water-related violent conflict.  His list, however, includes incidents in 
which water and water related infrastructure were tools and targets of violent 
                                                 
37 More general versions of the argument that most resources have substitutes, and, are thus 
unlikely to serve as causes of war, have been put forth by Deudney (1991), Simon (1996), 
Gleditsch (1998), and others. 
38
 In his history of the study of war, Singer (2000), describes how Polish economist Bloch, writing 
prior to the first World War, correctly predicted that the invention of machine guns would allow a 
small number of soldiers to hold out against a superior number of enemy forces, and that this 
would substantially raise the costs of preparation for and execution of wars.  Singer dryly 
commented that “being an economist, with that discipline's touching faith in the rationality of 
those in power, Block (sic) believed that the European elites would thus turn to other means of 
interstate conflict resolution” (p.6).  The news magazine The Economist stated its critique 
regarding the link between rational decision-making and war somewhat more succinctly: “wars are 
usually fought for much stupider reasons than water.” (The Economist, 1995: 53).  
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conflict, in addition to causes of it.  In a review of interstate conflict, Wolf (1999) 
noted that only one case of war explicitly over water could be documented, and 
this took place over 4500 years ago.  Moreover, he could document only seven 
cases of acute conflict over water.  This may explain why only a limited number 
of case studies of water conflict are presented in the water wars literature.  
 
In their systematic study of conflict and cooperation over water, Yoffe et al (2003, 
2004) also found that armed conflict over water resources was uncommon, and 
that war over water was, in fact, exceedingly rare.  Rather, in looking at behavior 
of countries sharing water resources, they found that cooperation was much more 
common than conflict overall and in all regions except the Middle East North 
Africa (MENA) region for the period 1948-1999.  Of the 1,831 events included in 
their survey, only 28% were conflictive, versus 67% that were cooperative (with 
5% neutral or insignificant).  Of the conflictive events the overwhelming majority 
were limited to verbal exchanges.  Only 37 events consisted of actual violent 
conflict, and 30 of these were in the Middle East.  Such results have led many 
analysts to conclude that shared water resources may actually be more of a 
catalyst for peace and cooperation than for conflict (e.g., Wolf, 1998; Haddadin, 
2000; Asmal, 2001; van der Molen and Hildering, 2005).39  
 
In a review of the field of war studies, Singer (2000) noted that often first stage in 
a field of research is speculation, in which researchers "invent some plausible 
explanations, and then ransack history for those causes that seem to support our 
hypotheses" (p. 4).  The most cited case study by proponents of the water war 
hypothesis is the violent conflict over water resources that took place between 
Israel and its neighbors in the 1950s and 1960s.  Several even make the far-
reaching claim that the 1967 war was itself a war over water (e.g., Pearce, 
                                                 
39 Hensel et al (2006) found that water scarcity was also associated with higher levels of 
cooperation between states, which, while not providing evidence against a water war scenario, at 




2006).40  Since the time of these events, however, the parties have endured the 
1973 war, two Israel-Lebanon wars, and two Palestinian uprisings, but no 
violence primarily over water; this despite a more than a four-fold increase in the 
population of the region and the resulting decline in per capita water availability.  
On the contrary, the region has witnessed water sharing agreements as part of 
both the Israel-PLO and Israel-Jordan peace agreements of 1993 and 1994 
respectively.  If, as seems reasonable, past incidents of water related violent 
conflict were attempts by the Arab parties to prevent the fledgling Israeli state 
from establishing itself, now that Israel is established, the likelihood of conflict 
over water in the region may be declining, rather than increasing as predicted by 
proponents of the water war hypothesis.  
 
The case study approach has also been criticized on methodological grounds.  In 
their critiques of the environmental security literature in general, analysts have 
pointed out that because cases are chosen specifically in which both resource 
scarcity and conflict exist, there is no variation in the dependent variable, and 
thus, hypotheses on the role of scarcity as a cause of conflict remain untestable 
                                                 
40 Several authors and some politicians have characterized the 1967 Arab-Israeli war as being 
driven at least in part by water resources.  Some, like Pearce (2006), a popular science journalist, 
claim that the war was a “water war”, while others make more modest claims that the war was 
fought, “partly” because of water related conflict (Cooley, 1984: 3), or that water-related tensions 
were “a major factor in the deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations that led to the Six-Day War in 
1967” (Shemesh, 2004: 1). Proponents of the hydrological imperative theory have often pointed to 
Israel’s capture of the West Bank and Golan Heights in this war as examples of their theory.  The 
strong claim that the war was primarily over water is not well supported.  Evidence provided by 
Pearce (2006), for instance, amounts merely to the statement of Ariel Sharon cited above, and the 
fact that Israel gained access to a large share of the Jordan basin as a result of the war.  While 
conflict over water resources no doubt aggravated relations between the parties, it was not the 
proximate or primary driver of 1967 conflict (Haddadin, 2002).  As Haddadin, a former Jordanian 
Minister of Water, points out, water was not even listed among the topics to be addressed in the 
United Nations’ Resolution 242 outlining steps to be taken to resolve the crisis.   
As in the case of almost all examples of water wars, it is extremely difficult to isolate the 
relative importance that securing water resources may have had in any decisions to initiate conflict 
or retain control over lands.  Several commentators have also claimed that Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in the 1980s and subsequent retention of a security zone in southern Lebanon was 
motivated by its desire for the waters of the Litani River (e.g., Myers, 1993).  It is now clear, 
however, that this claim has little credence.  There is no evidence that Israel utilized the Litani’s 
waters (Wolf, 1995), and Israel has subsequently withdrawn from Lebanon, despite increased 
water scarcity within Israel.  Indeed, Israel withdrew its forces in 2000, at the peak of a severe 
multiyear regional drought. This would seem to argue against a hydrological imperative being a 
primary driver of policy. 
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(e.g., Levy, 1995; Gleditsch 1998).  Several of the recent statistical studies 
attempt to address this.  They, however, suffer from their own limitations.  The 
most significant is that they find correlations between water-related variables and 
conflict, but generally fail to establish convincingly any causal relationships.  As 
noted above, in their study on the outbreak of domestic conflict between 1980 and 
1992, Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) do find a statistically significant correlation 
between conflict and water scarcity.  However, because they have data on water 
scarcity for only one point in time (1992), few, if any, conclusions can be drawn 
as to causal relationships. The results may simply reflect the fact that areas prone 
to conflict, such as the Middle East, just happen to be more arid than regions that 
have been more politically stable recently, such as Europe.  A similar critique can 
be made regarding the results of Hensel et al (2006) for international conflict.  For 
instance, one cannot determine if increasing scarcity results in increasing 
likelihood of conflict.  Neither study made use of both water scarcity and changes 
in water scarcity (and perhaps an interaction variable between them) to attempt to 
tease out causal relationships.  
 
Moreover, evidence from large sample size statistical studies is far from 
conclusive.  Neither Esty et al (1999) nor Levy et al (2005) found measures of 
water availability to have any impact on the likelihood of domestic conflict, and 
Stalley (2003) found similar results in the case of international conflict.  Gleditsch 
et al (2006) found no correlation between conflict, and nor between either 
drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream.  While 
Toset et al (2000) found that countries sharing a river are more likely to go to war 
than those that do not, they found no evidence that this likelihood has increased 
over time, as would be expected if water scarcity were the driving factor behind 
conflict.  Furthermore, Goldstone (2001) noted that even when environmental 
factors are statistically significantly correlated with the outbreak of violent 
conflict, they often are of relative unimportance when compared with other 




Finally, some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion 
that freshwater resources are increasingly scarce, an assumption on which the 
water war hypothesis relies heavily.  These “optimists” or “cornucopians”, as they 
are sometimes referred to, claim that because of increases in efficiency due to 
improved irrigation technologies, metering and pricing policies, and reductions in 
delivery loss rates and costs for desalination and reclaimed sewage, increasing 
scarcity of water is not a foregone conclusion, even with increasing populations 
(e.g., Myers and Simon, 1994; Simon, 1996; Lomberg, 2001).  To the extent that 
technological and management improvements do reduce scarcity, according to the 
premise of the water war hypothesis, they should also be expected to reduce the 
potential for violent conflict.  
 
In sum, despite instances of violent conflict over water in the past, there is little 
systematic evidence of high level conflict, much less all out war over water 
resources.  The evidence that such wars are likely appears inconclusive at best, 
and misleading at worst.  This has led some leading scholars on the topic to tone 
down or qualify their statements about the likelihood of future water wars.  
Compare, for example, Homer-Dixon’s declaration that ‘the renewable resource 
most likely to stimulate interstate resource war is river water” (p. 19), with his 
later statement that “wars over river water between upstream and downstream 
neighbors are likely only in a narrow set of circumstances…[and] there are, in 
fact, very few river basins around the world where all these conditions hold” (p. 
208).  Despite such a reality,  policy-makers continue to issue warnings and 
predictions of imminent water wars, and the topic remains prominent in headlines 
and articles in both the scholarly and popular press.  This article will now turn to 





3. Incentives for Stressing a Water War Scenario  
 
3.1. Incentives Presented in Existing Literature  
Observers have noted that various actors may have incentives for stressing or 
even exaggerating the risks of water wars.  Lonergan (2001) notes, for instance, 
that in “many cases, the comments are little more than media hype; in others, 
statements have been made for political reasons” (p. 110).  Beyond mere 
acknowledgement of the possibility of such incentives, however, little research 
has attempted to understand what these incentives are and how they may differ 
between actors.  An understanding of the motivations of various groups of actors 
to stress the possibility of imminent water wars can help explain the continued 
seemingly disproportionate popularity of such messages and help to evaluate 
more critically the warnings that are issued.  
 
Simon (1980), while not specifically addressing environmental conflict, suggests 
four possible reasons that academic researchers offer what he presented as overly 
gloomy scenarios regarding possible implications of resource scarcity (what he 
dubbed “an oversupply of false bad news”).  The first reason is that international 
funding organizations are eager to fund research dealing with crises, but not that 
producing good news.  The second is that bad news sells more newspapers and 
books, whereas good news does not.  The third is a psychological predisposition 
to focus on bad news or worst case scenarios.  The fourth is a belief, mistaken in 
his view, that sounding alarm bells can mobilize action to improve environmental 
issues.  
 
Haas (2002) offers two reasons why “exaggerated beliefs about resource scarcity 
and their possible threats to environmental security persist.”  The first is “the 
absence of any consensual mechanism for reconciling interdiscourse (or inter-
paradigm) disputes” (p.2).  This, Haas argues, allows for ideological outlooks to 
remain without resolution.  “The second reason is the elective affinity between 
environmental and security discourses on the one hand, and other dominant 
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discourses in social discussions... on the other hand.  Consequently self-interested 
political actors can borrow from discourses that are similar in their ontology and 
structure and that justify pre-existing political ambitions” (p.2).  Both 
explanations stem from the interdisciplinary nature of the environmental security 
problems, which allows multiple approaches, with few common methods of 
analysis.  
 
Trottier (2003) addresses the risks of water wars specifically.  She suggests that 
certain private sector actors in the water industry have an incentive to stress or 
exaggerate the risks of water wars in order to promote additional water-related 
infrastructure as a means for reducing the likelihood and/or impacts of such 
conflict.  
 
Straightforward explanations, such as “blood sells” given by Simon and the 
economic argument of Trottier, may have some merit, but ultimately are 
unsatisfying, in that they are not relevant for several actors and they oversimplify 
a multifaceted picture by ignoring other possible motives.  Such simplistic 
explanations also risk giving the impression that those offering such statements 
were on a mission to intentionally distort or mislead the public, which most 
certainly is not the case for many such actors.  Haas’s explanations also seem 
reasonable, but do not distinguish between differing incentives for different 
actors.  In sum, while the above are all interesting arguments, even taken 
collectively, they provide only a partial picture of existing incentives. 
 
3.2. Multiple Incentives for Multiple Actors  
This study goes beyond previous research by analyzing incentives of five 
different groups of actors, each of whom has played a role in the promotion of the 
water war hypothesis.  These are: a) political leaders and policy-makers, b) 
academic scholars, c) the news media, d) non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs) and e) the private sector.41  For each group, possible incentives at work 
for stressing a water war scenario are offered.  These are summarized in Table 3.1 
below.  The first entry for each group is the obvious case that they simply believe 
that water wars are imminent.  Given that there is some empirical evidence of past 
water related conflict and a real perception among many that it may lead to 
conflict, such a straightforward explanation should be taken seriously.  In 
addition, it can also be viewed as a credible null hypothesis.  As can be seen from 
the table, however, each group has several other possible incentives to stress the 
water war hypothesis, some unique to it, and some that overlap with those of other 
actors.  No attempt is made to verify that indeed these additional incentives have 
in fact played a role in the decision of a particular actor, though some examples 
are given in which such a scenario seems likely. 
                                                 
41 An additional group, intergovernmental organizations, shares many of the incentives of some of 




Table 3.1. Incentives to Stress or Exaggerate Risk of Water Wars  
 
Actor  Incentives to Stress or Exaggerate Risk of Water Wars  
Political leaders and 
policy-makers  
• Signal an actual risk of violence  
• Signal to riparian that water is considered high level 
politics  
• Signal to domestic population that water policy is taken 
seriously  
• Signal to third country desire for mediation  
• Serve as a negotiating tactic or intentional obstacle to 
negotiations 
• Raise profile of water related development or 
environmental needs  
Academic scholars  • Assessment that water wars are actually imminent or likely  
• Serve as null hypothesis of research into water and conflict  
• Claim that political statements and/or media publications 
are worthy of study in their own right  
• Raise profile of research and expand the pools of funding  
• Raise profile of water related development or 
environmental needs  
Journalists / 
Popular press  
• Assessment that water wars are actually imminent or likely  
• Reporting of statements by “experts”  
• Need for gripping headline  
• Need to shorten analysis into sound-bite or article length 
segment  
• Practice of giving equal coverage to opposing views  
• Practice of focusing on aspect of most interest to target 
audience  
• Raise profile of water related development or 
environmental needs  
Non-governmental 
organizations  
• Assessment that water wars are actually imminent or likely  
• Raise profile of water related development or 
environmental needs 
• Gain media coverage for organization  
• Expand pools of available funding  
Private Sector  • Assessment that such wars are actually imminent or likely  





3.2.1. Political leaders and policy-makers  
3.2.1.1. Signal an actual risk of violence  
The most straightforward reason that political leaders might warn of the dangers 
of a war over water is, of course, their belief that such a risk is actually imminent 
and/or to issue a meaningful threat to riparian countries that they are prepared to 
engage in warfare if actions are taken to deprive it of water resources.  Such 
threats appear to be the case, for instance, in the case of statements in the 1950s 
and 1960s by Israeli leaders, such as Finance Minister and later Prime Minister 
Levi Eshkol and General Moshe Dayan, that Israel would be prepared to take 
action against Arab forces should they interfere with Israeli water development 
projects (Gat, 2005; Shemesh, 2004).  This may well be the case too for 
statements by Sadat that Egypt would go to war to prevent Ethiopia from building 
dams, thereby threatening Egypt’s share of the Nile (Dinar and Wolf, 1994).  
Threats have long been recognized as common methods for inducing action or 
communicating intent between nations. In order to make threats of war useful 
tools of influence, some analysts have suggested that they have to be considered 
credible (Schelling, 1960).  Political leaders and policy-makers, however, have 
several other possible reasons for voicing water war risks other than to offer real 
and credible threats.  Indeed, given that research has shown that public threats 
seem more often to be met with defiance rather than compliance (e.g., Leng, 
1980), other reasons may in fact be primary ones.  
 
3.2.1.2. Signal to riparian that water is considered high level politics  
Issues of water management are often considered technical or bureaucratic issues 
far from the realm of “high politics”, which traditionally has focused on security 
and economic development.  Warning of risks of war over water can be a way to 
signal to a riparian country that their actions are being taken seriously at high 
levels of government.  This may be done, for instance, to convince a country to 
refrain from or redesign a planned action or to induce them into engaging in 
negotiations.  Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have long engaged in saber-rattling over the 
waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Naff and Matson, 1984; Kibaroglu and 
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Ünver, 2000).  Threats by Syria and Iraq to go to war with militarily superior 
Turkey over water were (unsuccessful) attempts to dissuade Turkey from 
developing dams upstream.  Güner (1998) describes the use of threats of war as a 
signaling tactic by Turkey and Syria in a game theoretic model of such 
interactions.  Such use of threats of war may have been an important signaling 
device, even if the likelihood of the threat being realized was limited.  
 
3.2.1.3. Signal to domestic population that water policy is taken seriously  
Political leaders may not only wish to signal to rival governments, but to their 
domestic constituencies as well.  Indeed, as Putnam (1988) and others have noted, 
national political leaders are often engaged in two-level decision-making in which 
they must simultaneously attempt to balance both domestic and international 
political demands.  In many developing countries agriculture is both generally 
responsible for the bulk of water withdrawals and plays a large role in the national 
economy and national employment.  In more economically developed countries, 
agriculture is also the largest water consuming sector, but generally plays a 
smaller role in both the overall economy and in national employment.  
Nonetheless, agricultural lobbies in industrial countries are often still quite 
influential.  A public statement of willingness to fight for water rights is likely to 
send a signal to domestic constituencies that water rights are being taken seriously 
by the national government, whether or not they intend to back up such threats.  
Additionally, they may be issued with the intent of persuading a domestic 
audience to favor or oppose a particular political party or position who will 
prevent such wars from occurring.  
 
In analyzing the “bellicose statements, even at the highest levels” of the Indian 
and Pakistani governments in the 1950s and 1960s, Alam (2000:349) suggests 
that “though the statements made by key decisionmakers in public may suggest a 
move towards war, the statements are used to generate domestic support for a 
political position.  As seen in the Indus basin the political rhetoric did not match 
the governments’ actions which sought to resolve an international water dispute 
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through cooperation…  The experience from the Indus basin, therefore, throws 
into question whether public statements made for a domestic audience are truly 
indicative of a country’s intent to go to war over shared waters.”     
 
3.2.1.4. Signal to third country a desire for mediation  
Another possibility is that threats or warnings of war are meant to influence third 
parties, who often play a role in mediating disputes between nations and in 
financing water development projects.  Lebanese diversions of waters of the 
Wazzani River, a tributary of the Jordan, presented a very minor threat to the 
Israeli economy, especially in the amounts being withdrawn at the time that 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon issued his warnings that continued diversions 
could spur military conflict (Amery, 2002).  These warnings may have been 
meant to prevent a precedent for future more significant diversions that would 
present a significant threat to Israel.  It is also possible that Sharon was attempting 
to engage a third party to mediate between Israel and Lebanon, with whom Israel 
has no direct diplomatic relations.  Indeed, soon after the statements were made, 
U.S. officials became involved in surveying the existing waterworks, allaying the 
fears of the Israelis, and eventually, negotiating an agreement between the sides.  
American officials also reportedly requested from the Israelis that messages 
should be transmitted through them and not through threats of military reprisals 
(Walla!, 2001).  
 
Similarly, Iraqi threats against Syria in the 1970s spurred intervention by the 
Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, who helped negotiate a settlement.  In addition, 
during this period Iraqi threats of military action against Turkey, a stronger 
upstream neighbor, may not have been intended only to send a signal to Turkey, 
but also to the international financial community, including the World Bank, 
which was contemplating funding of Turkish dams at the time (Kibaroglu and 
Ünver, 2000).  Threats of war are likely to undermine possible credit options for 
nations seeking to finance large scale water projects.  Thus, political leaders may 
issue them in order to deter institutions for offering finance or to encourage their 
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intervention to change the terms of the projects being considered.  Threats of 
violent conflict were also important in motivating World Bank efforts to help 
negotiate an agreement between India and Pakistan on the Indus River in the 
1960s (Ward, 2002); and at least one analyst has suggested that the risk of 
regional instability is at least partly a factor in dissuading international agencies 
and governments from financing dams in Ethiopia (Collins, cited in Ward, 
2002:185-186). Hensel et al (2006), in an empirical study of conflict and 
cooperation over international waterways, found that water scarcity was, in fact, 
positively correlated with third party assistance.  
 
3.2.1.5. Serve as negotiating tactic or intentional obstacle to negotiations 
Almost all scholars familiar with the water war hypothesis, whether or not they 
think water wars likely, readily admit that water policy is intimately intertwined 
with other political issues and conflicts.  Another possible rationale for policy-
makers to issue threats or warnings of war over water is as a negotiating tactic 
regarding issues that may or may not be directly related to water resources.  
Güner (1998) explains how threats of military and terrorist acts between Syria and 
Turkey, while ostensibly over shared water resources, were likely linked to other 
issues such as territorial disputes and separatist movements.  He states that in 
1993 then Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ҫiller sent a message to Syrian President 
Hafez al-Assad stating that there would be no solution to water disputes between 
the nations unless Syria prevented the Kurdish separatist group PKK from acting 
within its territory.  
 
Rather than serve to induce action in negotiations over issues other than water, it 
is also possible that threats or warnings of war by political officials are meant to 
prevent negotiations or concessions on such issues.  Some authors have claimed 
that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Golan Heights was motivated by its 
desire to control the water resources of those areas (e.g., Cooley, 1984; Stauffer, 
1982; Stork, 1983).  Regardless of the veracity of such claims, what is clear is that 
political figures have used the risk of future war over water as a justification for 
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not relinquishing control of these territories.  While many experts agree that 
accords over shared water resources between Israel and its neighbors are possible 
and need not be an obstacle to larger peace agreements (e.g., Haddadin, 2000, 
2002), political officials and other parties opposed to territorial concessions have 
raised the risks of water wars in their litany of reasons to maintain control of 
territory.42  
 
3.2.1.6. Raise profile of water related development or environmental needs 
One reason to stress the risks of war over water, common to all groups of actors 
looked at in this study, is to bring attention to aspects of water management that 
may otherwise be deemed by policy-makers as less deserving of attention and/or 
funding.  By raising the specter of war, an official can also draw attention to 
issues such as sanitation, pollution, or other environmental or development 
concerns that may not otherwise be on many people’s political agendas.  For 
instance, British diplomat John Ashton, the United Kingdom’s “Climate 
Ambassador”, reportedly said that global warming should be recast as a security 
issue to help mobilize support for cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions (Doyle, 
2007).  Such a rationale seems reasonable in explaining declarations concerning 
water wars made by other officials in governments and at bodies such as the 
World Bank or UNESCO (UN, 2006), which are formally charged with 
development and educational issues, not conflict resolution.  
 
3.2.2. Academic Scholars  
3.2.2.1. Assessment that such wars are actually imminent or likely  
Again, the null hypothesis is that academic scholars truly believe that water wars 
are distinct possibilities.  As noted above, such an explanation is supported by the 
existence of past violent conflict over water as detailed in case studies, plausible 
theoretical models, and some systematic empirical studies.  
 
                                                 
42 Sherman (2002), an Israeli academic, presents an argument against the provisions for water in 
the Oslo Peace Accords between Israel and the PLO, in which he cites several Israeli officials 
making such claims.   
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3.2.2.2.  Serve as null hypothesis of research into water and conflict  
Studies attempting to demonstrate that risks of water wars are unlikely or 
presenting the issue simply as a worst case scenario still serve to keep the issue 
alive in the public consciousness and in political and academic debates.  
Moreover, these studies implicitly give the water wars hypothesis at least minimal 
credibility by deeming it worthy of study and/or useful as a working hypothesis in 
empirical studies.  In addition, because empirical studies in this field are still few, 
and theories remain speculative, publications both supporting and refuting the 
risks of conflict invite further work. 
 
3.2.2.3. Political statements and/or media publications as fields of study in their 
own right 
Many researchers may focus on the threats of water wars as topics of interest in 
their own right, even if they are not concerned with the probability of actual risks 
of conflict.  Statements by public officials, media coverage of risks, the role of 
threats in international negotiations, the economic justifications (or lack thereof) 
of resource wars, are all legitimate subjects of study. 43   Researchers may focus 
on some aspect of the water war topic without needing to address the credibility 
of the threats.  Furthermore, as Haas points out, the interdisciplinary nature of the 
topic allows researchers from a multitude of fields to apply their own theoretical 
framework to the issue and offers them a wide range of journals in which to 
potentially publish their results.44  While these studies need not necessarily 
promote the water war hypothesis, they do keep the issue alive in public affairs 
and academic circles.  
 
                                                 
43 The topic of conflict over water resources has been the subject of special issues of several 
leading academic journals from a variety of such fields including, for instance, Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 20 (1-2), 1997; Arab Studies Quarterly Spring, 2000; International Negotiation, 
5(2), 2000; Political Geography 25(4),  2006; Society and Natural Resources 15(8), 2002. 
44 Haas 2002. 
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3.2.2.4. Raise profile of research and expand the pools of available funding 
Connecting water to issues of security and war that are of interest within high 
level policy circles and the general public also offers researchers a way to raise 
the profile of their work.  Thus they are more likely to gain access to policy-
makers and make a name for themselves.  Furthermore, because the topic is 
interdisciplinary, they expand the number and types of journals in which they can 
publish, and gain exposure to audiences outside their particular field of expertise, 
which offers possibilities for further research collaboration. 
 
Without necessarily supporting or denying Simon’s claim that financial sponsors 
encourage exaggerated bad news, one at least should to recognize that financial 
incentives may play a role, resulting in an over-representation of such views.  
Water policy specifically, and environmental policy in general, are 
interdisciplinary in nature, and thus research on these topics is open to a range of 
fields from both the natural and social sciences, each with its respective sources of 
funding. Security studies has its own large pool of funding, which can be 
substantial given the importance attached to security in policy.  Thus, those 
connecting the two issues of resource scarcity and security open up large new 
pools of possible funding.45  This does not ensure that researchers will promote 
such linkage, but it does represent a financial incentive to do so.  Again, even if 
results of such studies do not find concrete linkages between resource scarcity and 




                                                 
45 As an example, the European Union’s Research Framework Programme serves as a significant 
source of funding for academic and other research institutions in the EU and several associated 
countries.  In the latest call for proposals at the time this article was being written, the Seventh 
Research Framework Programme (FP7), a budget of 200 million Euro was designated for 
environmental studies, and an additional 80.3 million Euro for security studies. In addition, several 
of the topics under other calls, such as social science and the humanities, would also potentially 
cover studies on environmental security issues (http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/dc/index.cfm accessed 
on 1 May, 2007). 
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3.2.2.5. Raise profile of water related development or environmental needs 
As in the case of political figures and NGOs, there is also a distinct possibility 
that researchers attach the risk of water war in order to draw attention to and 
increase understanding of other water management issues, or in order, as Simon 
(1980) stated, to mobilize action on particular environmental or development 
issues.  Several books, for example, have the phrase “water war” in the title, 
although actual discussion of violent conflict over water represents a relatively 
minor portion of the book, with the bulk being dedicated to various water 
management issues.46  The intent of such books appears to be an effort to raise 
attention to some aspect of water management.  The authors use the risk of violent 
conflict simply as motivational device in that it highlights in their view the 
potential dangers of failing to take action. 
 
3.2.3. Journalists and the Popular Press  
3.2.3.1. Assessment that water wars are actually imminent or likely  
The null hypothesis that journalists stress the risks of water wars because they feel 
them to be legitimate risks cannot be discounted.  The job of the press, however, 
is primarily to relay information and analysis, rather than to conduct it itself.  
Therefore, in the case of the media, this explanation is really a statement that the 
press believes the assessments of experts who stress the risks of violence over 
water resources. 
 
3.2.3.2. Reporting of statements by “experts”  
A wealth of literature addresses both how the media covers both environmental 
issues and issues of security and conflict, and no attempt to survey this literature 
will be made here.47  From this extensive literature, several trends have been 
established that are relevant to this study.  Several observers have noticed that 
establishment figures have privileged access to media.  Cottle (2003) notes that 
                                                 
46 See for example: de Villiers (1999), Ward (2002), Shiva (2004), and Olivera and Lewis (2004).  
47 For surveys and edited volumes addressing environment and the media, see for example, Anders 
(1993) or Anderson (1997).  For surveys and edited volumes on conflict and the media, see for 
example, Aubin (1998), Cohen (1990), or Cottle (2006). 
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elites are considered inherently worthy of media coverage.  Becker (1967) 
describes the media’s deference to establishment as part of a perceived “hierarchy 
of credibility".  Davis (2003) states that journalists are drawn to government and 
institutional sources in positions of power and expect them to provide expert 
knowledge.  Thus, he concludes, journalists grant such officials 'primary definer' 
status.48  He also notes that because of concerns over cost competitiveness, 
journalists increasingly rely on outside sources considered credible for 
information and analysis.  
 
The prospect of imminent water wars was first presented by authorities with 
“primary definer” status.  Once established, it has remained a popular theme in 
the popular press, despite the subsequent evidence suggesting the risks of an 
actual occurrence of water wars are low.  Furthermore, if political leaders 
continue to make reference to the possibilities of water wars, the media can be 
expected to continue to report such comments, regardless of the state of academic 
research supporting or refuting such claims.  
 
3.2.3.3. Need for gripping headline  
Dunwoody and Peters (1995) in their study on media coverage of technological 
and environmental risks, caution about claims of bias in media coverage, given 
that there is no objective standard by which to judge such claims.  Simon’s (1980) 
observation that “bad news sells” more than good news, however, has ample 
empirical support.  Cottle (2003), for example, provides numerous examples to 
support his claim that the press tends to focus on exceptional or violent behavior.  
Disagreements over water allocations may be considered rather mundane and thus 
not newsworthy, while violence over such allocations is.  Thus, the media is 
predisposed to favor coverage of a position presenting the possibility of water 
wars over positions suggesting that such conflicts are not likely.  For example, an 
article on water in the Middle East written by Fried (2007) and published in the 
                                                 
48 Herman and Chomsky (1988) go even further, asserting that relations of economic dependency 
ensure that political leaders are given preferential access to and coverage by the media.  
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San Francisco Chronicle was titled “Future of war will go with the flow” with the 
byline “Water promises to be flash point”; this, despite the fact that experts 




3.2.3.4. Need to shorten analysis into sound-bite or article length segment  
Perhaps ironically, the article cited above was one of the more balanced portrayals 
of the current state of knowledge in that it bothered to present the viewpoint that 
water might not lead to warfare.  Because the media is increasingly structured 
around presenting brief sound-bites or catchy headlines (Davis, 2003), they 
frequently reduce complex issues into memorable catchphrases and simplistic 
storylines, at the expense of nuanced explanation, and often at the expense of 
accuracy.  Bird and Dardenne contend that "news stories, like myths, do not ‘tell 
it like it is’, but rather, ‘tell it like it means’" (1988:337), or what the media feels 
should be the story, rather than what the facts actually depict.  Aubin (1998), in a 
book titled Distorting Defense, noted how pressures to provide pithy coverage of 
complex security issues have resulted in inaccurate media coverage, and how, 
once established, this misinformation has managed to persist in subsequent 
coverage.  
 
3.2.3.5. Practice of giving equal coverage to opposing views  
The quest for “balanced coverage” itself, however, may be a contributor to the 
amount of media exposure granted to the risk of water wars.  When confronted 
with differing expert opinions regarding highly specialized or technical issues, the 
press often attempts to provide equal coverage, regardless of the side with which 
                                                 
49 The article included a quote from a high-ranking official in the Israeli Foreign Ministry stating 
that “(t)he idea of water wars is sexy and appealing but it's media hype…  The reality of the 
situation is: If you have scarce resources it won't do any good to fight over them; you will only 
redivide the scarcity,” and one from the Palestinian director of a regional environmental NGO who 
stated "I totally disagree with any suggestion of war over water. It doesn't make sense because war 




the weight of expert opinion lies (Dearing, 1995). Dunwoody and Peters (1992) 
refer to such a strategy of balance as “a surrogate for validity checks” (p.210).  
While journalistic ideals are to present facts and truths, the press is often not 
competent to evaluate the merits of opposing expert opinion.  In lieu, of 
presenting the truth, they often present opposing sides of an issue equally, with 
the premise that they are providing the audience with information to decide for 
themselves.  While this provision of equal coverage is ostensibly done in the spirit 
of fairness and balance, it can result in disproportionate coverage of a minority 
viewpoint.  Press coverage of climate change is a well documented example, in 
which, the overwhelmingly minority viewpoint among climate scientists that 
climate change is not occurring has been given prominent media coverage 
(Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004).  Although no content analysis of media coverage of 
conflict over war was undertaken for this study, given the lack of consensus on 
the water wars issue, journalistic protocol is likely to produce a similar outcome 
in which the prospect of water wars is given at least as much attention (and almost 
certainly more) as the viewpoint that such wars are unlikely.  
 
3.2.3.6. Practice of focusing on aspect of most interest to target audience  
While the conventional wisdom that “bad news sells” seems to be well 
established, researchers have found that not all bad news is the same in terms of 
newsworthiness.  Singer and Endreny (1987) found a “lack of congruence 
between the size of the risk and the amount of media coverage it receives.”  
Combs and Slovic (1979:841) found, for instance, that relative to actual objective 
risks, “disease appeared to be greatly underreported while violent, often 
catastrophic events… stood out as being overreported”.  Water related illnesses 
kill between 5 and 10 million people a year (UNDP, 2006; Wolf, 2007).  This is 
several times the combined number of casualties from all the wars in the world 
each year.  These deaths, however, are less newsworthy than the prospect of war, 
precisely because they are not new.  They are long-standing, chronic problems. 
Moreover, they generally afflict the poorer classes in developing countries, but 
not the target audience of the media.  Wars may be more likely to have some kind 
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of spillover effect that could impact or interest the typical reader of the media, 
especially the Western media. 
 
 3.2.2.6. Raise profile of water related development or environmental needs 
Like the other groups looked at in this study, journalists too may make reference 
to water wars in order to draw attention to development or environmental issues 
related to water that, on their own, would likely not be deemed newsworthy.  
Thus, for instance, the risk of water wars in often mentioned in articles in which it 
is not the primary topic, but rather, merely presented as a type of exclamation 
point or worse case scenario.  The Boston Globe published an editorial 
provocatively titled, “The next world war will be over water”, the text of which 
concentrated almost solely on presenting statistics on water scarcity and the health 
impacts of such scarcity (Rothfeder, 2002). 
 
3.2.4. Non-governmental organizations  
3.2.3.1. Assessment that water wars are actually imminent or likely  
The number of nongovernmental organizations has increased exponentially over 
the past few decades and such organizations play an increasingly important role in 
shaping global environmental and development policy agendas in general 
(Princen and Finger, 1994; Wapner, 1996).  Over the last few years, a number of 
NGOs have adopted environmental security issues as a field of concern.50  Many 
have raised the issue of water wars in the course of their activities.  Several NGOs 
have played a leading role in framing perceptions of policymakers and 
influencing parties regarding transboundary water management (Dinar, 2002).  
Some of their incentives to do so largely overlap with those of groups already 
discussed.  Among these is the genuine belief that violent conflict over water is 
imminent.  
 
                                                 
50 Examples include the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Environmental 
Change and Security Program, based in Washington D.C., the Institute for Environmental 
Security, based in the Hague, and Adelphi Research, based in Germany. 
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3.2.4.2. Raise profile of water related development or environmental needs 
Of all groups listed, NGOs face perhaps the strongest incentive to use the specter 
of water wars in order to raise the profile of water related development or 
environmental goals they happen to be championing.  By tying their main issue – 
be it equitable water sharing, development of basic water infrastructure, pollution 
prevention, etc. – to conflict over water, they offer those that sympathize with 
their mission an additional reason to offer support and/or take action.  The British 
based World Development Movement, for instance, lists as its primary objective 
the elimination of the underlying causes of poverty.  On its website it lists water 
among its numerous and wide-ranging current and past campaigns topics, which 
also include: international trade, climate change, tobacco, asbestos, genetically 
modified organisms, transnational corporations, international debt relief, and toys.  
It provocatively named its water campaign “Stop Water Wars”, though the 
primary goals of the campaign are advocacy in support of provision of basic water 
and sanitation services to the poor and opposition to privatization of the water 
industry. Similarly, a warning on the risks of war over water figures prominently 
on the top of the homepage of the website www.worldwaterwars.com, although 
relatively little on the website relates to the potential for water-related violence.  
Rather, it primarily lists environmental and development issues related to water 
quality and water privatization.  
 
3.2.4.2. Gain media coverage for organization  
Because a major objective of many NGOs is public education and raising 
awareness about their pet issue, they are often eager to access media outlets to 
spread their message.  Anderson (2003) notes that the media constitute a primary 
public arena in which their claims “compete for access and public legitimacy”.  
Press coverage not only helps NGOs highlight their cause, but also offers indirect 
financial incentives.  Media exposure can increase visibility of the organization as 
well as its causes, thereby increasing the pool of potential members and donors.  
In addition, many NGOs use press coverage as evidence of their effectiveness in 
reporting to current and future sources of funding.  Press coverage can also serve 
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as a channel through which advocacy oriented NGOs can communicate to and 
exert influence on policymakers.  As one analyst commented, the media provides 
a range of major services to third parties in need of external support (Cottle, 
2003).  Given the lack of media attention to chronic issues such as sanitation and 
pollution, NGOs have an incentive either to link such subjects to that of water 
wars or to simply add environmental security to their agenda in order to increase 
the potential for media coverage.  
 
Many observers have noted that NGOs and other “non-elites” can face serious 
challenges in attracting media attention (Cottle, 2003).  In order to gain access, 
some organizations, notably among them environmental NGOs, have resorted to 
“exceptionally strange or violent acts as a substitute for their lack of status or 
resources” in order to attract the media’s eye (p. 37).  However, as some have 
noted, “The benefit of outlandish behavior is media attention, the price is that you 
get stuck in this role or caricaturization” (Anderson, 2003).  In order for their 
message to be taken more seriously, many environmental organizations have 
moved away from such tactics (Cottle 2003: 37).  In order to attract media 
attention while toning down behavior, one option is for NGOs to increase the 
severity or immediacy of their message.  Certainly linking an environmental or 
development related issue to the prospect of water war is one method of doing so, 
even if only presenting these wars as worst case scenarios to be avoided.  Because 
similar warnings are being made by political figures and academics, whose 
standing with the media is better established, such claims may be perceived by the 
press as having additional credibility, which should improve the likelihood of 
media coverage.  
 
3.2.4.2. Expand pools of available funding 
Many, if not most, NGOs are in a constant search for funding. As in the case of 
academic scholars, combining issues can open up new pools of funding.  
Environmental and security or peace-related NGOs thus face an economic 
incentive to expand their focus to include some aspect of environmental security, 
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and water wars can be a part of this.  Several NGOs have combined some aspect 
of conflict resolution and environmental protection.  Conca et al (2005) and others 
have noted the increased role of NGOs in environmental peacemaking.  This is 
not to question the intent of such organizations or the sincerity of their missions; 
merely to point out the potential financial benefit in addressing such issues.  
Again, even if they are not explicitly promoting or supporting the water war 
hypothesis, in addressing the issue, they help to keep it in the public 
consciousness.  
 
3.2.5. Private Sector  
Conflict can affect possibilities for and terms of investment, and as such, the 
private sector tends to be a keen analyst of information regarding political and 
military risks.  The private sector, like the other actors considered, may issue 
warnings about the risks of violent conflict over water because it considers such 
risks credible.  As Trottier (2003) notes, however, certain private industry actors 
have an incentive to promote the risks of war in order to encourage policy-makers 
to invest in water infrastructure that would reduce scarcity  Examples include 
desalination, inter-basin pipelines, and international water shipping.   
 
A representative of a desalination facility under construction in Israel commented, 
for instance, that “unfortunately water is one of the reasons that create war. If you 
compare the cost of one F-16, it is more or less the cost of this desalination plant.  
I believe at the end of the day it will be much cheaper to solve conflict based on 
this type of plant than through buying new F-16s”  (Leyne, 2004).  A developer of 
large bags that can be filled with water and towed to facilitate international 
shipping of water is even more direct.  The company’s website quotes World 
Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s statement that the next century’s wars 
will be over water, and then claims that “Waterbag technology will have a direct 
impact on the Peace Process in the Middle East.”51  
                                                 





Water industry leaders promoting such technological and supply-side fixes have 
an incentive to stress that their projects may reduce the risks of war over scarce 
water resources.  This potential benefit of decreasing scarcity through additional 
infrastructure may be important in gaining an advantage over demand reduction 
policies, which are often economically more efficient options.  Political figures 
may also have an incentive to promote such policy options, insofar as they are 
influenced by industry representatives.52   
 
4. Conclusions  
 
The prospect of water wars has been the subject of much political, academic, and 
media attention.  It is not the aim of this article to claim, as others have, that the 
prospect of war is not at all realistic (e.g., Beaumont, 1994).  Water has been and 
continues to be a source of political conflict, at times even violent conflict.  Past 
instances of such violent conflict are rare, but as populations grow, economies 
develop, and climatic conditions change, past trends may not be indicative of 
future scenarios.  Given both the relatively thin empirical evidence and the 
numerous theoretical critiques of the water war hypothesis, however, the prospect 
of wars over water resources is markedly over-represented in political, academic, 
and journalistic forums.  As this study suggests, various actors face incentives to 
stress or even exaggerate the possibility of such conflict.  This can explain the 
significant exposure and tractability that such warnings have received to date.     
 
Some of the incentives discussed above are relevant to multiple actors, such as the 
use of the threat of war to highlight other water-related issues.  This overlap in 
interests can serve to strengthen the incentive if parties understand that other 
                                                 
52 Allan (2002a), a long-time analyst of Middle-east politics and water management, seems to 
support a connection between political risks and the adoption of water technology.  He claims that 
Israeli policy-makers intentionally delayed initiating desalination technology so as not to reduce 
Israel’s claims to water in negotiations with the Palestinians.  Israel did begin development of 
large scale desalination plants in 2001-2002 following the deterioration of relations and cessation 
of negotiations with Palestinians. 
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actors will be receptive to such actions.  Also, actions by different actors are 
mutually reinforcing.  Policy-makers are not only covered by the media, but also 
react to it. NGOs may seek access to policy-makers via the media, or seek to use 
the media to mobilize action to pressure policy-makers, and, in turn the media 
may seek out NGOs for sources of information.  Academics too may covet media 
coverage in order to publicize their findings, and may be sought out by the media 
as credible sources of information.  Similarly, policy-makers often rely on 
academics for credible information on which to base policies, and academics 
often treat the behavior and statements of policy-makers as subjects of their 
studies.  Furthermore, political motives are not limited to policy-makers, but may 
be shared by other actors who seek to influence public policy.  This mutually 
reinforcing web of interactions, together with common incentives to stress the 
risks of water wars, may well be serving to maintain the issue of water wars in 
public discourse.  
 
Overstating the prospects of conflict over water resources entails risks of its own.  
Raising the specter of war to raise attention to or mobilize action on related 
issues, for instance, may ultimately have the opposite effect of reducing attention 
to environmental or development causes. Attention and resources may get 
redirected towards preventing conflict rather than towards preventing pollution or 
providing sanitation.  Policymakers and other decision-makers may feel that as 
long as violent conflict is avoided, they have been successful.  Similarly, by 
focusing on water as a cause of conflict, attention may be drawn away from more 
important or proximate causes.  These caveats noted, numerous examples suggest 
that the incentive to use the possibility of resource wars to highlight other issues is 
still very strong and influential.  
 
This study presented incentives for stressing the risks of water wars, without 
addressing possible incentives actors may face to underestimate or deemphasize 
such risks, such as a desire not to undermine investment opportunities or ongoing 
negotiations.  The study was also meant to be suggestive, rather than conclusive.  
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It did not attempt to estimate or quantify the actual influence of the various 
incentives laid out above in motivating the behavior of the set of actors described. 
Rather, it simply provided examples in which it seems reasonable that the 
incentives were relevant.  Nor did it suggest methods for identifying when such 
incentives are in fact responsible for actions by a given party.  Furthermore, 
because this analysis generates plausible hypotheses based on real world decision-
making but supported by anecdotal evidence, it is subject to much of the same 
critiques leveled against much of the environmental security literature, including 
the water war hypothesis, as noted above.  Such limitations noted, this study does 
provide analysts with a conceptual framework with which to start evaluating 
various claims regarding the prospects of violent conflict over water and other 
natural resources. 
  
Systematic verification of the relative importance (or lack thereof) of the various 
incentives laid out in this study is left to future research.  In many cases necessary 
information may be impossible to obtain.  For instance, it may not be possible to 
identify with certainty the true motivations of a politician issuing warnings or of 
academics in choosing research programs, let alone the relative weight of multiple 
motivating factors.  Nevertheless, possible avenues for such research include: a) 
content analyses of media coverage of international water scarcity, especially of 
treatment of the possibility of water related conflict; b) systematic review of the 
context in which references to water wars were made by political figures in order 
to draw issue linkage maps; c) documentation of changes in the level of funding 
supporting environmental security related issues, and analysis of changes in the 
number of grant proposals sponsored by major grant issuing institutions 
supporting research into water and conflict; and d) a systematic analysis of private 
sector declarations on the issue of water wars to identify whether the private 
sector tends to promote or dispel a water war hypothesis.   
 
While the specific topic of this study was conflict over water, much of the 
analysis is relevant to discussions of conflict over other natural resources and to 
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broader discussions of environmental security in general.  Analysts in this field 
have long acknowledged “that one cannot dismiss the political motives of those 
who wished to elevate – or prevent the elevation – of environmental concerns to 
the same status as military ones” (Diehl and Gleditsch, 2001: 3).  The intent of 
this study was to provide a clearer picture of these motives, with the hope that a 
better understanding of the various incentives to stress the risks of violent conflict 
over scarce resources will assist analysts in evaluating the credibility of the many 
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